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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the least squares estimation of a panel structure threshold re-
gression (PSTR) model where both the slope coeﬃcients and threshold parameters may exhibit
latent group structures. We study the asymptotic properties of the estimators of the latent
group structure and the slope and threshold coeﬃcients. We show that we can estimate the
latent group structure correctly with probability approaching 1 and the estimators of the slope
and threshold coeﬃcients are asymptotically equivalent to the infeasible estimators that are
obtained as if the true group structures were known. We study likelihood-ratio-based inferences
on the group-specific threshold parameters under the shrinking-threshold-eﬀect framework. We
also propose two specification tests: one tests whether the threshold parameters are homogenous
across groups, and the other tests whether the threshold eﬀects are present. When the number
of latent groups is unknown, we propose a BIC-type information criterion to determine the
number of groups in the data. Simulations demonstrate that our estimators and tests perform
reasonably well in finite samples. We apply our model to revisit the relationship between capital
market imperfection and the investment behavior of firms and to examine the impact of bank
deregulation on income inequality. We document a large degree of heterogeneous eﬀects in both
applications that cannot be captured by conventional panel threshold regressions.
Key words: Classification, Dynamic panel, Latent group structures, Panel structure model,
Panel threshold regression.
JEL Classification: C23, C24, C33
∗The authors thank the co-editor Oliver Linton and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments on the
paper. They also thank Mingli Chen, Michael Fan, Peter C.B. Phillips and Yichong Zhang for discussions on the
subject matter and participants in the 2019 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Xiamen) and the 2019 China
Meeting of the Econometric Society (Guangzhou) for helpful comments. Su gratefully acknowledges the funding
support provided by the Lee Kong Chian Fund for Excellence. Wang acknowledges the financial support by the
EUR Fellowship. All errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. Address correspondence to: Liangjun Su, School of
Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore, 178903; Phone: +65 6828 0386; e-mail:
ljsu@smu.edu.sg.
1
1 Introduction
Threshold models have a wide variety of applications in economics; see Durlauf and Johnson (1995),
Potter (1995), Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2013), and Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2015), among
others. In both the cross sectional and time series framework, asymptotic theory for estimation
and inference in threshold models has been well developed. See, e.g., Chan (1993) and Hansen
(2000) on asymptotic distribution theory for the threshold estimator in the fixed-threshold-eﬀect
and shrinking-threshold-eﬀect frameworks, respectively, and Hansen (2011) for a review on the
development and applications of threshold regression models in economics. Both Chan (1993) and
Hansen (2000) require the exogeneity of the regressors. Endogeneity has been considered in some
existing papers; see, e.g., Caner and Hansen (2004), Kourtellos, Stengos and Tan (2016), and Yu
and Phillips (2018). In the panel setup, Hansen (1999) studies static panel threshold models with
exogenous regressors and threshold variables; Seo and Shin (2016) propose a GMM method to
estimate dynamic panel threshold models with additive fixed eﬀects, where either the regressors
or the threshold variables can be endogenous; and Miao, Li and Su (2018) study estimation and
inference in dynamic panel threshold regression with interactive fixed eﬀects.
All existing studies in panel threshold models assume that the slope coeﬃcients and threshold
parameters are common across all individual units. However, such an assumption of homogeneity
is vulnerable in practice given that individual heterogeneity has been widely documented in empir-
ical studies using panel data. See, e.g., Durlauf (2001) and Su and Chen (2013) for cross-country
evidence and Browning and Carro (2007) for ample microeconomic evidences. In panel thresh-
old regressions, heterogeneity can exist in not only the slopes but also the threshold coeﬃcients.
Neglecting latent heterogeneity in any aspect can lead to inconsistent estimation and misleading
inferences. In particular, pooling individuals with diﬀerent threshold values would bias the thresh-
old and the slope coeﬃcient estimation, and it can even lead to a failure in detecting any threshold
eﬀect in finite samples since heterogeneous threshold eﬀects may oﬀset each other. Even if all
units share the same threshold coeﬃcient, ignoring heterogeneity in the slopes would also lead to
inconsistent estimates.
In this paper, we propose a new panel threshold model that allows the slope and threshold
coeﬃcients to vary across individual units. We model individual heterogeneity via a grouped
pattern, such that all the members within the same group share the same slope and threshold
coeﬃcients, whereas these coeﬃcients can diﬀer across groups in an arbitrary manner. Hence, the
latent group structure may result from two sources of heterogeneity: that in the slope coeﬃcients
and that in the threshold level coeﬃcients. We allow the group membership structure (i.e., which
individuals belong to which group) to be unknown and estimated from the data. We refer to our
model as a panel structure threshold regression (PSTR) model.
Using a panel structure model that imposes a group pattern is a convenient way to model
unobserved heterogeneity, and they have recently received much attention; see Lin and Ng (2012),
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), Ando and Bai (2016, 2017), Su, Shi, and Phillips (2016), Lu and
Su (2017), Liu et al. (2018), Su and Ju (2018), Su, Wang and Jin (2019), and Okui and Wang
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(2019), among others. An important advantage of the panel structure model is that it allows
flexible forms of unobserved heterogeneity while remaining parsimonious at the same time. As
group structure is latent in such a model, the determination of an individual’s membership is the
key question. Several approaches have been proposed to address this issue. Sun (2005), Kasahara
and Shimotsu (2009), and Browning and Carro (2011) consider finite mixture models. Su, Shi, and
Phillips (2016) propose a variant of the Lasso procedure (C-Lasso) to achieve a classification in
this regard, and this method has been extended to allow for two-way component errors, interactive
fixed eﬀects, nonstationary regressors, and semiparametric specification, respectively, in Lu and Su
(2017), Su and Ju (2018), Huang, Jin and Su (2019), and Su, Wang and Jin (2019). Lin and Ng
(2012), Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), Sarafidis and Weber (2015), and Liu et al. (2018) extend
the K-means algorithms to the panel regression framework. Wang, Phillips and Su (2018) and
Wang and Su (2019) propose to identify the latent group structure based on the Lasso or spectral
clustering techniques in the statistics literature. In the nonparametric literature, Vogt and Linton
(2017, 2019) consider procedures to estimate the unknown group structures for nonparametric
regression curves.
To estimate the PSTR model, we consider a least-squares-type estimator that minimizes the
sum of squared errors. We choose the least-squares approach for classification because the group,
slope, and threshold parameters can be estimated simultaneously, which facilitates the theory. The
disadvantage is that we cannot allow for endogeneity in the regressors and threshold variables.
Cases with endogenous regressors or threshold variables require diﬀerent and more complicated
analysis and will be left for future research. Due to the presence of the latent group structure
and threshold parameters, we do not have an analytically closed-form solution to the problem.
We propose to employ an EM-type iterative algorithm to find the solution with multiple starting
values. Under some regularity conditions, we show that our estimators of the slope and threshold
coeﬃcients are asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding infeasible estimators of the group-
specific parameters that are obtained by using individual group identity information.
To study the asymptotic properties of the estimators of the threshold coeﬃcients, we follow the
lead of Hansen (2000) and consider the shrinking-threshold-eﬀect framework, where the threshold
eﬀect is diminishing as the sample size approaches infinity. In this framework, we can make in-
ferences regarding each threshold parameter by constructing a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. We
show that the LR statistics are asymptotically pivotal in the case of conditional homoskedasticity
and that they depend on a scale nuisance parameter otherwise. Such a scale parameter can be
consistently estimated nonparametrically when conditional heteroskedasticity is suspected.
We also consider two specification test statistics. The first one is designed to test the homo-
geneity of the threshold parameters across each group via the LR principle. The corresponding LR
test statistic is non-standard and involves a linear combination of two-sided Brownian motions. We
show how one can obtain the simulated -value with estimated parameters in our discussion. This
test is useful since pooling units, if their threshold coeﬃcients pass the homogeneity test, improves
the eﬃciency of threshold estimation, especially in small samples. The second is designed to test
the absence of the threshold eﬀect under the null by adopting the method proposed by Hansen
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(1996). In our latent group structure framework, one may suspect the presence of a subset of
threshold eﬀects among all groups, and we also need to take into account the uncertainty caused
by the unknown group structure when studying the asymptotic behavior of the test.
We evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed tests and estimation methods via
extensive simulation studies. First, the proposed information criterion can determine the correct
number of groups with a large probability, regardless of whether any threshold eﬀect is present.
Given the number of groups, the next task is to test the existence of threshold eﬀects. Our proposed
test has an appropriate size and non-trivial power in detecting the threshold eﬀect. The power is
an increasing function of the strength of both the threshold eﬀect and sample size. A nice feature
of the test is that it performs well regardless of whether the threshold is heterogeneous across
units. If the threshold eﬀect is present, one can further test whether the threshold parameters
diﬀer across groups. We demonstrate that our test for the homogeneity of the threshold is also
well-behaved in terms of size and its power improves as the degree of threshold heterogeneity
and sample sizes increase. Finally, after the model and the number of groups are specified, we
can proceed with parameter estimation. Our estimation method performs well in heterogeneous
panels with threshold eﬀects in finite samples. With this method, we can precisely estimate group
membership, and the clustering accuracy improves as the number of time periods increases. Both
the threshold parameters and slope coeﬃcients can be precisely estimated. Moreover, we find
that when the threshold parameters are homogeneous across groups, pooling observations with a
common threshold does improve the eﬃciency of threshold estimation, which in turn highlights the
importance of testing the homogeneity of the threshold parameters.
We illustrate the usefulness of our methods through two real-data examples. First, we revisit the
relationship between capital market imperfections and firms’ investment behavior. We document
a large degree of heterogeneity in firms’ investment behavior, which is bounded by various types of
financial constraints, such as cash flow, Tobin’s Q, and leverage. Such heterogenous threshold eﬀects
cannot be captured by the conventional panel threshold regressions. Next, we examine the impact
of bank regulation, particularly branch deregulation, on income inequality in the US, allowing
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in their impact. We find a group pattern of heterogeneity
in the impact of deregulation across states even after controlling for the threshold eﬀect. The group
structure coincides with geographic locations to some extent but not perfectly, and the threshold
eﬀects appear to be salient in each group. This application again demonstrates the usefulness of the
PSTR since it allows us to capture both observed heterogeneity through thresholds and unobserved
heterogeneity through the latent group structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model
and estimation method. In Section 3, we introduce the assumptions and examine the asymptotic
properties of the estimators of the latent group structure and the slope and threshold coeﬃcients.
In Section 4, we introduce the inference procedure on the threshold parameters and propose a
specification test for the homogeneity of the threshold parameters across groups. In Section 5,
we consider the specification test for the presence of threshold eﬀects. In Section 6, we propose
a BIC-type information criterion to determine the number of groups. We conduct Monte Carlo
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experiments to evaluate the finite sample performance of our estimators and tests in Section 7. We
apply our model to study the relationship between investment and financing constraints and the
relationship between bank regulation and income distribution in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
The proofs of the main results in the paper are relegated to the Appendix. Further technical details
can be found in the online Supplementary Materials.
To proceed, we adopt the following notation. The indicator function is denoted as 1(·). 0×
denotes an  ×  matrix of zeros. For two constants  and , we denote max( ) as  ∨  and
min( ) as ∧. For an × real matrix , we denote its transpose as 0 and its Frobenius norm
as kk (≡ [(0)]12) where ≡ means “is defined as”. For a real symmetric matrix , we denote
its minimum eigenvalue as min() The operators → and → denote convergence in probability and
distribution, respectively. We use ( ) → ∞ to denote the joint convergence of  and  when
 and  pass to infinity simultaneously. Alternatively, as the co-editor suggests, one can consider
the pathwise asymptotics as in Phillips and Moon (1999) and Vogt and Linton (2009).
2 The Model and Estimates
In this section we first present the panel threshold model with latent group structures and then
introduce the estimators of all the parameters in the model.
2.1 The Model
Let  denote the number of cross-sectional units and  the number of time periods. We consider
the model
 = 000 + 
000 · (
0
0 ) +  +   = 1    = 1   (2.1)
where  is a  × 1 vector of observable regressors, () ≡1( ≤ )  is a scalar threshold
variable,  is the individual fixed eﬀect and  is the idiosyncratic error term. Note that we allow
both the slope and threshold coeﬃcients to be group specific: 0 is a scalar threshold coeﬃcient, 0
is a×1 vector of regression coeﬃcients that lies in a compact parameter space B, and 0 is a×1
vector of threshold-eﬀect coeﬃcients for  ∈ G ≡ {1  }, where  is a fixed integer known as
the number of groups. The group-membership variable 0 ∈ G indicates to which group individual
unit  belongs. This group-membership variable is unknown and has to be estimated from the data.
All members in group  have the same coeﬃcients (00  00  0)0. We assume 0 ∈ Γ = [ ] for all
 ∈ G, where  and  are two fixed constants. Following the lead of Hansen (2000), we will work
in the shrinking-threshold-eﬀect framework by assuming that 0 ≡ 0 → 0 as ( ) → ∞ for
each  ∈ G unless specified otherwise.
Let D ≡ (1  )0 ∈ Γ, G ≡ (1   )0 ∈ G and Θ ≡ (01  0)0 ∈ B where  ≡
(0 0)0 ∈ B ⊂ R2 . For any given group structure G, we let G = {|  = , 1 ≤  ≤ } be
the index set of the members in group  ∈ G. We denote the true parameters as (Θ0D0G0),
where Θ0 ≡ (001   00)0, D0 ≡ (01  0)0 and G0 ≡ (01  0 )0. Analogously, we denote the
true members in group  ∈ G by G0 = {| 0 = , 1 ≤  ≤ }.
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For the moment, we assume that the true number of groups 0 is known and given by . In
Section 6, we will discuss how to determine 0 in practice.
2.2 Estimation
To remove the individual-specific fixed eﬀects , we employ the usual within-transformation which
leads to
˜ = ˜000 + ˜(
0
0 )
000 + ˜  = 1    = 1   (2.2)
where ˜() ≡ () − 1
P
=1 (), and ˜, ˜ and ˜ are defined analogously. Let
() ≡ (0 0())0 and ˜() ≡ () − 1
P
=1 (). Then the model in (2.2) can be
rewritten as
˜ = ˜(00 )
000 + ˜  = 1    = 1   (2.3)
Given , we can obtain the following least squares estimator of (ΘDG) :
(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) = argmin
(ΘDG)∈B×Γ×G
Q(ΘDG)
where
Q(ΘDG) =
X
=1
X
=1
£˜ − ˜()0¤2  (2.4)
For any given threshold D and group structure G, the slope coeﬃcients   = 1   can be
estimated by
ˆ(DG) =
Ã X
=1
X
=1
1( = )˜()˜()0
!−1 X
=1
X
=1
1( = )˜()˜
Concentrating out Θ, we can estimate the threshold D and group structure G by
(Dˆ Gˆ) = argmin
(DG)∈Γ×G
Q˙(DG) (2.5)
where Q˙(DG) ≡ Q(Θˆ(DG)DG) and Θˆ(DG) = (ˆ1(DG)0  ˆ(DG)0)0.
To find the solution to the above optimization problem, we need to search over the space of
(DG) to minimize the objective function in (2.5). We propose to employ the following EM-type
iterative algorithm to conduct the searching process:
Algorithm 2.1 Set G(0) as a random initialization of the group structure G and let  = 0.
Step 1 For given G(), compute
D() = argminD∈ΓQ˙(DG())
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Step 2 For given D() = {()   = 1 } and G() = {()   = 1 }, compute the slope
coeﬃcients for each group  ∈ G
ˆ() =
Ã X
=1
X
=1
1(() = )˜(() )˜(() )0
!−1 X
=1
X
=1
1(() = )˜(() )˜
Step 3 Compute for all  ∈ {1     },
(+1) = argmin∈G
X
=1
[˜ − ˜(() )0ˆ() ]2
Step 4 Set  = + 1. Repeat Steps 1-3 until numerical convergence.
The above algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 in Bonhomme and Manresa (2015, BM here-
after) and it alternates among three steps. Steps 1 and 2 are the “update” steps where one updates
the estimates of the threshold parameter and those of the slope coeﬃcients in turn. Step 3 is an
“assignment” step where each individual  is re-assigned to the group (+1)  The objective func-
tion is non-increasing in the number of iterations and we find through simulations that numerical
convergence is typically very fast. Nevertheless, it is hard to ensure that the obtained solution is
globally optimal because it depends on the chosen starting values. In practice, one can start with
multiple random starting values and select the solution that yields the lowest objective value.
3 Asymptotic Theory
In this section, we study the asymptotic properties of the estimators of the group structure, slope
and threshold parameters. We first show the consistency of the group structure estimator and then
establish the asymptotic properties of the estimators of the slope and threshold coeﬃcients.
3.1 The estimator of the group structure
We establish the consistency of the group structure estimator in this subsection. Let F ≡
({(  −1) (−1 −1 −2) }=1) where  () denotes the minimal sigma-field gener-
ated from  Let  = (1   )0  = (1   )0 and  = (1   )0. We use  to denote
the number of individuals belonging to group  :  = ¯¯G0 ¯¯. That is, ¯¯G0 ¯¯ denotes the cardinality
of G0 For any group structure G, let
 ( ˜DG) ≡ 1
X
=1
X
=1
1(0 = )1( = ˜)˜(˜)˜(˜)0
Let 0    ∞ denote a generic constant that may vary across places. Let max = max1≤≤ 
max = max1≤≤ and max = max1≤≤ max1≤≤  We first make the following assumptions.
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Assumption A.1: (i.1) For each  = 1   ,  = 1   , (|F−1) = 0 a.s., or (i.2) for each
 = 1   ,  = 1   , (| ) = 0 a.s.;
(ii) {(  ) :  = 1 2   } are mutually independent of each other across ;
(iii) The process {(  )   ≥ 1} is a strong mixing process with mixing coeﬃcients []
satisfying max1≤≤ [] ≤  for some constants   0 and  ∈ (0 1).
(iv) The parameter space B and Γ are compact so that sup∈B kk ≤  and Γ= [ ];
(v) max kk8+0 ≤  and max(kk8+0) ≤  for some 0  0;
(vi) The threshold eﬀect satisfies 0 = ( )−0 for some constants  ∈ (0 12) and 0 6= 0
for all  ∈ G.
Assumption A.2: There exists a constant   0 such that for all  ∈ G,
Pr
µ
inf
(GD)∈G×Γ
max˜∈G {min[ ( ˜DG)]}  
¶
→ 1 as ( )→ 1
Assumption A.3: (i) For all  ˜ ∈ G with  6= ˜, we have °°0 − 0˜°°   for some constant
  0;
(ii) For any  6= ˜ and 1 ≤  ≤  , we have [˜0(0˜ − 0)]2 ≡ ˜ ≥ ˜ for some constant
˜  0;
(iii) For all  ∈ G : lim→∞ =   0
(iv)  = ( 2) and  = (2) as ( )→∞
Assumption A.1(i)—(iii) is similar to Assumption A.2(a)—(c) in Su and Chen (2013). The major
diﬀerences lie in four aspects. First, Su and Chen (2013) consider linear panel data models with
interactive fixed eﬀects and the sigma-field F there also incorporates the factors and factor
loadings, whereas we consider the panel threshold regression models with a latent group structure
and the additive fixed eﬀects. Second, Su and Chen (2013) only consider Assumption A.1(i.1)
and allow for lagged dependent variables to appear in the regressor vector. Here we consider both
scenarios in Assumption A.1(i): the martingale diﬀerence sequence (m.d.s.) condition in A.1(i.1)
and the strict exogeneity condition in A.1(i.2), where we allow for dynamic panels in the first
scenario and assume strict exogeneity in the second scenario. In the second scenario, we allow for
serial correlation of an unknown form in the error term. When A.1(i.1) holds, we have asymptotic
biases for the estimators of the slope coeﬃcients. When A.1(i.2) holds and serial correlation is likely
to appear, we have to use the HAC estimator for the asymptotic variance of the slope estimators.
Third, due to the potential appearance of the lagged dependent variables in the regression model,
Su and Chen (2013) use the notion of conditional strong mixing for the process while we focus on
the case of unconditional strong mixing in our model in Assumption A.1(iii). In other words, we
follow Hahn and Kuersteiner (2011) and treat the fixed eﬀects ’s to be nonrandom in our setting
in the dynamic case. If ’s are random, we can modify the unconditional strong mixing conditions
to the conditional strong mixing conditions as in Su and Chen (2013). Fourth, Su and Chen (2013)
assume conditional cross-sectional independence whereas we assume cross-sectional independence
in Assumption A.1(ii).
8
A.1(iv) is imposed to facilitate the proof as we do not have closed form solutions to our op-
timization problem. Assumption A.1(v) imposes some moment conditions on the regressors and
error terms, which are weaker than the exponential tail assumption in BM (2015). Assumption
A.1(vi) assumes shrinking threshold eﬀect as in Hansen (2000). In this framework, the asymptotic
distribution of the estimator of  is pivotal up to a scale eﬀect, which facilitates the inference pro-
cedure. In part E of the online supplement we study the asymptotic properties of our estimators in
the fixed threshold eﬀect framework. In the latter case, the inference becomes diﬃcult in practice
and one can consider extending the smoothed least squares estimation of Seo and Linton (2007) to
our PSTR model.
Assumption A.2 is similar to Assumption 1(g) in BM (2015). Given any conjectured group
structure G and for each  ∈ G, we cannot assume min[ ( ˜DG)]   for any ˜ ∈ G due
to the possibility of very few individuals assigned to be in group ˜. However, there exists some
group ˜ ∈ G, in which a positive proportion of  members are assigned. As BM (2015) remark,
such an assumption is reminiscent of the full rank condition in standard regression models.
Assumption A.3(i) and (iii) parallels Assumption A1(vi)—(vii) in Su, Shi, and Phillips (2016,
SSP hereafter). A.3(i) requires that the group-specific slope coeﬃcients be separated from each
other, and it can be relaxed to allow the diﬀerences between the group-specific slope coeﬃcients
to shrink to zero at some slow rates at the cost of more lengthy arguments. It is worth em-
phasizing that the latent group structure is identified through the separation of group-specific
slope coeﬃcients and we find that the potential separation of the threshold parameters is not
necessary; see the remarks after Theorem 3.1 for futher discussions. A.3(iii) implies that each
group has an asymptotically non-negligible proportion of individuals as  → ∞. Noting that
[˜0(0˜ − 0)]2 = (0˜ − 0)0(˜˜0)(0˜ − 0) A.3(ii) is automatically satisfied under A.3(i) pro-
vided that the minimum eigenvalue of (˜˜0) is bounded away from zero. Apparently,  cannot
contain time-invariant regressors under Assumption A.3(ii). Assumption A.3(iv) puts some restric-
tions on the relative magnitudes of  and  which can be easily met in many macro and financial
applications. If we follow BM (2015) and assume exponentially-decaying tails, we can relax the
conditions on ( ) to   → 0 as ( ) → ∞ for some   0 If we follow Vogt and Linton
(2019) and consider the pathwise asymptotics by setting  = ( ) for some divergent function (·)
and passing  →∞. Then Assumption A.3(iv) can be satisfied when ( ) 2+( )2 converges
to some nonnegative finite constant as  →∞.
The following theorem reports the consistency of the estimators of the group membership for
all individuals.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.3 hold. Then
Pr
Ã
sup
1≤≤
1(ˆ 6= 0 ) = 1
!
→ 0 as ( )→∞
Theorem 3.1 is similar to Theorem 2 of BM (2015). This theorem states that as ( )→∞,
we can correctly estimate the group structure with probability approaching one (w.p.a.1). From
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the proof of the above theorem, we can see that the identification of the true group structure highly
hinges on Assumption A.3(i). In particular, since we permit 0 = 0 → 0 as ( )→∞ under
the shrinking-threshold-eﬀect framework, the proof of Theorem 3.1 mainly relies on the diﬀerences
of 0’s across groups. In this case, as long as the slope coeﬃcients in one regime are separate
from each other across the  groups, they are also separate from each other asymptotically in the
other regime and whether the threshold parameters in diﬀerent groups diﬀer from each other does
not matter. In other words, the threshold parameters do not need to separate from each other.
In the online Supplementary Material, we give a proof of Theorem 3.1 under the fixed-threshold-
eﬀect framework. We show that in that case, either the separation among 0’s or that among 0’s
is suﬃcient for identifying the latent group structure under some regularity conditions. To stay
focused, we will work in the shrinking-threshold-eﬀect framework below.
3.2 The estimators of the slope and threshold coeﬃcients
Given the fact that the latent group structure can be recovered from the data at a suﬃciently fast
rate (see Lemma A.3 in the appendix), we will show that the estimators of the slope and threshold
coeﬃcients are asymptotically equivalent to the infeasible estimators that are obtained as if the
true group structure were known. Then we derive the asymptotic distributions of the coeﬃcient
estimators.
To establish the asymptotic equivalence, we add some notation. Let ˜( ∗) = ˜()−˜(∗).
Let (·) denote the probability density function (PDF) of . For all  ∈ G, define
() = 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜()0
˜() = 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜( 0)˜( 0)0
− 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜( 0)˜()0 [()]−1 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜( 0)0
 () = 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
[0()]
 () = 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
(0| = )() and
 () = 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
(02| = )()
Let () = lim( )→∞ (), () = lim( )→∞ (), () = lim( )→∞  (),
0 = (0) and  0 = (0). We add the following two assumptions.
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Assumption A.4: (i) There exists a constant   0 such that Pr (min∈Γ min [()] ≥ ) → 1
as ( )→∞ for all  ∈ G;
(ii) There exists a constant   0 such that min∈Γ ©Pr(min[˜()] ≥  min[1 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯])ª→ 1
as ( )→∞ for each  ∈ G
Assumption A.5: (i) max∈Γmax(kk4 | = ) ≤  for  =  and ;
(ii) () is continuous over Γ and max sup∈Γ () ≤  ∞
(iii) For  ∈ G, () and () are continuous at  = 0;
(iv) There exists a constant   0 such that inf∈Γ min[()] ≥  for all  ∈ G.
Assumption A.4(i) is a non-colinearity assumption for the regressors and A.4(ii) holds because
 k()− (∗)k ³ | − ∗| under some regularity conditions on { }  where  ³  means
and both  and  are bounded away from zero. It’s natural to expect that the first term in the
definition of ˜() is of the same probability order as ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯. A.4(ii) requires that after projecting
˜( 0) onto ˜(), the associated residual exhibits the same probability order of variations
groupwise. Assumption A.5 imposes some conditions on the conditional PDF and moments of
 and . A.5(i) requires that the fourth order conditional moment of  and  be well
behaved; A.5(ii) requires that the PDF of  be uniformly bounded; A.5(iii)—(iv) requires the
probability limits of some quantities associated with the asymptotic variance be well behaved.
To state the next theorem, we define the infeasible estimators of the slope and threshold coef-
ficients that are obtained with known group structures:
(Θˇ Dˇ) ≡ argmin
(ΘD)∈B×Γ
Qˇ(ΘD) (3.1)
where Qˇ(ΘD) ≡ Q(ΘDG0) With the knowledge of the true group structure G0, we can split
the  individuals into  groups perfectly and estimate the group-specific parameters for each
group. Let Qˇ( ) =P∈G0P=1[˜ − ˜()0]2. Then we have
Qˇ(ΘD) =
X
=1
Qˇ( ) and (ˇ ˇ) = argmin
()∈B×Γ
Qˇ( ) for each  ∈ G
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic equivalence between the feasible estimator (Θˆ Dˆ)
and the infeasible estimator (Θˇ Dˇ)
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold with  ∈ (0 13) in Assumption A.1(vi).
Let  = ( )1−2 Then we have ( )12
°°°Θˆ− Θˇ°°° → 0 and  (Dˆ− Dˇ) → 0
Theorem 3.2 shows that Θˆ−Θˇ = (( )−12) and Dˆ−Dˇ = (−1 ) by restricting  ∈ (0 13)
in Assumption A.1(vi). Under Assumptions A.1—A.5, we can show that Θˇ−Θ0 = (( )−12 +
−1) and Dˇ has  -rate of convergence. Therefore, the estimator (Θˆ Dˆ) has the same asymptotic
distribution as that of (Θˇ Dˇ). Then we can establish the asymptotic distribution of our least squares
estimator.
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To report the asymptotic distributions of ˆ and ˆ , we add some notation:
 ( ∗) ≡ 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜(∗)0
Ω1( ∗) ≡ 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜(∗)02
Ω2( ∗) ≡ 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
X
=1
˜()˜(∗)0 and
B () ≡ 1
X
∈G0
X
=2
X

 [()] 
Assumption A.6: (i) For each  ∈ G, the following probability limits exist and are finite:
( ∗) = plim( )→∞  ( ∗) Ω( ∗) = plim( )→∞Ω( ∗) for  = 1 2, and
B() = lim( )→∞ B ()
(ii)  ( ∗) → ( ∗) and Ω( ∗) → Ω( ∗) for  = 1 2 uniformly in  ∗ ∈ Γ
Assumption A.6 imposes some conditions on the probability limits of random quantities that are
associated with the asymptotic variance and bias of Θˆ. Here, we follow Hansen (2000) and assume
directly that  and Ω for  = 1 2 converge uniformly to some limits. The uniformity
greatly facilitates the proofs of Theorem 3.3 below.
We establish the asymptotic distribution of our estimators in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.6 hold with  ∈ (0 13) in Assumption A.1(vi).
Let  = ( )1−2, 0 = (0 0) B0 = B(0) and Ω0 = Ω(0 0) for  = 1 2 Then
for each  ∈ G
(i)
p (ˆ − 0)− (0)−1q B0 → N (0 (0)−1Ω01(0)−1) under Assumption A.1(i.1) andp (ˆ − 0) → N (0 (0)−1Ω02(0)−1) under Assumption A.1(i.2);
(ii)  (ˆ − 0) → T where  = 
00  0 0
(00 00 )2  T = argmax ∈
£−12 ||+()¤  and
(·)  ∈ G, are mutually independent two-sided Brownian motions.
Theorem 3.3 establishes the asymptotic distributions of the estimators of the slope and threshold
coeﬃcients. Note that we strengthen Assumption A.1(vi) slightly to require  ∈ (0 13). From the
proof of Lemma A.7 that is used in the proof of the above theorem, we can easily find that such
an extra condition is not needed if we only consider the case where  →  for some  ∈ (0∞)
When we allow for dynamics in Assumption A.1(i.1), the estimator ˆ of the group-specific
slope coeﬃcient 0 exhibits a bias term to be corrected as in standard dynamic panels. One can
conduct the bias correction by estimating 0 and B0 consistently by
ˆ ≡ 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
X
=1
˜(ˆ)˜(ˆ)0 and Bˆ = 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
X
=2
X

(ˆ)ˆ
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where ˆ =
¯¯¯
Gˆ
¯¯¯
denotes the cardinality of Gˆ Gˆ ≡ { : ˆ = } for  ∈ G, and ˆ = ˜ −
˜(ˆ)0ˆ Similarly, it is easy to show that a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance of ˆ
in this case is given by ˆ−1 Ωˆ1ˆ−1  where Ωˆ1 = 1ˆ
P
∈Gˆ
P
=1 ˜(ˆ)˜(ˆ)0ˆ2When ( )
is strictly exogenous in Assumption A.1(i.2), we allow for serial correlation in the error terms. In
this case, we propose to estimate the asymptotic variance of ˆ by ˆ−1 Ωˆ2ˆ−1  where Ωˆ2 is a
panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator:
Ωˆ2 = 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
"
Λˆ0 +
X
=1
(Λˆ + Λˆ0)
#

where  = 1−||    satisfies 1+3 → 0 as  →∞ and Λˆ = 1
P
=+1 ˜(ˆ)˜−(ˆ)0
×ˆˆ− Following Su and Jin (2012) and the results in Theorems 3.2—3.3, we can show that Ωˆ2
and ˆ−1 Ωˆ2ˆ−1 are consistent estimators of Ω02 and (0)−1Ω02(0)−1 respectively.
Theorem 3.3(ii) indicates that the asymptotic distribution of ˆ is pivotal up to a scale parameter
, which is similar to that given by Theorem 1 in Hansen (2000). It is well known that this
result highly relies on the assumption that the threshold eﬀect converges to zero as ( ) →
∞ Under the fixed-threshold-eﬀect framework ( = 0), it is possible to demonstrate  (ˆ −
0) =  (1) but the asymptotic distribution of ˆ will not be asymptotically pivotal even after
appropriate normalization. In addition, it is well known that the above scale parameter  cannot
be consistently estimated. To make inference on the threshold parameters, we propose to apply
the likelihood ratio test in the next section.
4 Inference on the Threshold Parameter
In this section, we consider inference on the threshold parameter D = (1  )0. We consider
three cases. The first case is to test the null hypothesis on the threshold parameter  for a single
group  ∈ G :
01 :  = 0 for some 0 ∈ Γ
Next, we consider testing the homogeneity of the threshold parameters:
02 : 01 =  = 0 = 0 for some 0 ∈ Γ
If one fails to reject the hypothesis of common threshold parameter for all groups, one can estimate
the model with a common threshold parameter, , say. Then we can study the inference on the
common threshold parameter
03 :  = 0 for some 0 ∈ Γ
4.1 Likelihood ratio test for a single 
To test the null hypothesis 01 :  = 0, a standard approach is to use the likelihood ra-
tio (LR) test. If we know the true group structure, the likelihood ratio test statistic can be
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constructed as in Hansen (2000). In our framework, we need to construct the test statistic
based on the estimated group structure {Gˆ  ∈ G}. Let ¯() ≡ argmin∈B Q¯( ), where
Q¯( ) ≡P∈GˆP=1 [˜ − ˜()0]2  We follow the lead of Hansen (2000) and propose to em-
ploy the following LR test statistic for  :
L () ≡ ˆ Q¯(¯() )− Q¯(ˆ ˆ)Q¯(ˆ ˆ)

The major diﬀerence is that we consider the minimization of Q¯( ) instead of the infeasible
version Qˇ( ). In the proof of Theorem 4.1 below, we show that Q¯( ) and Qˇ( ) are
asymptotically equivalent so that we can study the asymptotic distribution of the LR test statistic
based on the minimization of the infeasible objective function.
For each  ∈ G, let 2 =lim( )→∞ 1
P
∈G0
P
=1(2),  = 00  0 0 and  =
00 00 . Let 2 =lim( )→∞ 1
P
=1
P
=1(2) The following theorem establishes the as-
ymptotic null distribution of the above LR test statistic.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.6 hold with  ∈ (0 13) in Assumption A.1(vi).
Then under 01 :  = 0, we have
L (0) → 2 for each  ∈ G
where 2 = 2 and  = max∈[2() − ||] has the distribution function characterized by
Pr( ≤ ) = (1− −2)2.
Theorem 4.1 indicates that the asymptotic distribution of the LR test statistic constructed from
the estimated group structure is asymptotically equivalent to that of the infeasible test statistic
obtained from the true group structure. Now, we still have a nuisance parameter 2. In the special
case where we have conditional homoskedasticity along both the cross-section and time dimensions,
2 = 1 and the LR statistic is asymptotically free of any nuisance parameter. If heteroskedasticity
is suspected, then we need to estimate 2 consistently. Noting that
2 =
plim( )→∞ 1
P
∈G0
P
=1[(00 )2| = 0]
¡0¢
2plim( )→∞ 1
P
∈G0
P
=1[(00 )2| = 0]
¡0¢ 
we propose to estimate 2 by
ˆ2 =
P
∈Gˆ
P
=1(ˆ − )(ˆ0ˆ)2
ˆ2P∈GˆP=1(ˆ − )(ˆ0)2 
where ˆ2 = Q˜(ˆ ˆ)(ˆ ) () = −1() → 0 is the bandwidth parameter and  (·)
is a kernel function. We can readily show that ˆ2 = 2 +  (1) and ˆ2 = 2 +  (1) under some
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standard weak conditions on  and  (·)  Given the consistent estimate of 2 we can consider the
normalized LR statistic
NL (0) = L (0)ˆ2
We can easily tabulate the asymptotic critical value forNL (0)We can also invert this statistic
to obtain the asymptotic 1−  confidence interval for  :
1− = © ∈ Γ : NL ≤ 1−ª 
where 1− denotes the 1− percentile of  For example, 1− = 594 735, and 1059 for  = 010
005, and 001, respectively.
4.2 Test for a common threshold parameter
In applications, it is likely that all individuals share a common threshold parameter, although their
slope coeﬃcients may still vary across groups. In this case, estimating the model with the common-
threshold restriction imposed improves the asymptotic eﬃciency of the threshold estimator. Thus
motivated, one may wish to test the homogeneity of the threshold parameter prior to estimation.
In this section, we consider testing the null hypothesis
02 : 01 =  = 0 = 0 for some 0 ∈ Γ
Let D = {D = (  )0  ∈ Γ} ⊆ Γ be the restricted parameter space and D ≡
(  )0 ∈ D. Then the null hypothesis can be equivalently rewritten as 02 : D0 ∈ D. We can
estimate the model by restricting D ∈D under 02 :
(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) = argmin
(ΘDG)∈B×D×G
Q(ΘDG)
Then we can construct the LR test statistic by
L = Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)−Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) 
The following theorem studies the asymptotic distribution of L under 02
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.6 hold with  ∈ (0 13) in Assumption A.1(vi).
Under the null hypothesis 02 : D0 ∈ D, we have
L →
X
=1
˜2max∈[2()− ||]−max∈
⎡
⎣
X
=1
˜2
¡
2()−
¯¯¯¯¢
⎤
⎦ ≡ Ξ
where  = 1 ˜2 and ˜2 =  (2).
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Theorem 4.2 indicates that the limiting distribution Ξ of L involves two sets of nuisance
parameters, viz, ˜2 and  for  ∈ G. Under conditional homoskedasticity, we have ˜2 = 1 for each
. If heteroskedasticity is suspected, then we need to estimate ˜2 consistently. If  is homogeneous
across , we do not need to estimate it. However,  is generally not homogeneous across  and we
need to estimate it via estimating ˜2 1  and . Using Theorem 3.1, it is easy to show that a
consistent estimator of  is given by ˆ = ˆ Noting that ˜2 = 
2
2 2 and

1 =
plim( )→∞ 1
P
∈G0
P
=1[(00 )2| = 0]
¡0¢
plim( )→∞ 11
P
∈G01
P
=1[(001 )2| = 0] (0)

we propose to estimate ˜2 and 1 respectively by
b˜2 = ˆ2 ˆ2ˆ2 and ˆˆ1 =
1
ˆ
P
∈Gˆ
P
=1(ˆ − )(ˆ0)2
1
ˆ
P
∈Gˆ1
P
=1(ˆ1 − )(ˆ01)2

where ˆ2 = 1
P
=1
P
∈Gˆ
P
=1[˜− ˜(ˆ)0ˆ]2 It is easy to show that the above estimators are
consistent under standard conditions and a consistent estimator of  is given by ˆ = ˆˆ1 ˆb˜2 To
find out the -value, we can simulate the asymptotic distribution with these estimates. Basically, we
can simulate  independent two-sided Brownian motions (·)’s and construct the corresponding
statistic where the nuisance parameters are replaced with their consistent estimates. Simulating a
large number of times, we can mimic the asymptotic distribution suﬃciently well. Then, we can
reject the null hypothesis at the prescribed  level, if the test statistic is larger than 1− quantile
of the simulated distribution.
4.3 Likelihood ratio test for a common threshold parameter
Suppose we have common threshold parameters, we can use the restricted estimator (Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)
defined in the last subsection. Even in this case, the estimators of the group-specific slope coef-
ficients share the same asymptotic distribution as the unrestricted estimators studied in the last
section due to the asymptotic independence between the estimators of the slope coeﬃcients and
that of the threshold parameter.
To make inference on the common threshold parameter , we also consider an LR test for
03 :  = 0 The LR test statistic is now defined by
L () = Q(Θˆ(D  Gˆ)D Gˆ)−Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) 
where Θˆ(D  Gˆ) is defined as in Section 2.1 and the superscript  is an abbreviation for “com-
mon”. Note that 03 :  = 0 can be equivalently rewritten as 03 : D0 = D0 
The next theorem establishes the asymptotic distribution of L () under 03
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Theorem 4.3 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.6 hold with  ∈ (0 13) in Assumption A.1(vi).
Under the null 03 : D0 = D0 , we have
L (0) → 2max∈ [ ()− ||] 
where 2 =
³P
=1 
´

³
2P=1 ´ 
Like before, we can estimate the nuisance parameter 2 consistently by the nonparametric
estimator:
ˆ2 =
P
=1
P
=1(ˆ − )(ˆ0ˆˆ)2
ˆ2P=1P=1(ˆ − )(ˆ0ˆ)2 
where ˆ is the estimator of the common threshold parameter  under 02, () = −1()
→ 0 is the bandwidth parameter and  (·) is a kernel function.
5 Test for the Presence of Threshold Eﬀect
In application, one may suspect that a set of groups do not have the threshold eﬀect. In this case,
we can verify the existence of threshold eﬀects for  ≤  groups by testing the null hypothesis
H0 : 01 =  = 0 = 0
versus the alternative hypothesis H1 : 0 6= 0 for some  ∈ G where G ≡ {  = 1  } ⊂ G.
To study the local power of our test, we consider the following sequence of Pitman local alternatives
H1 : 0 = 
√ for  ∈ G
Let c ≡ (01  0 )0 and L ≡ (1    )0⊗ where ⊗ denotes Kronecker product,  ≡ [0×   ]
and  is a  × 1 vector with th entry being 1 and other entries equal to zero. Then we can
rewrite the null and local alternative hypotheses respectively as
H0 : LΘ0 = 0×1 and H1 : LΘ0 = c
√
Note that c = 0×1 corresponds to the null hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects and we allow 0
for  ∈ G to shrink to zero at the ( )−12-parametric rate under the local alternative. Under
H1 , the early estimators of Θ0 and G0 continue to be consistent with any D ∈ Γ despite the
fact that we cannot identify D0.
As we do not know the true group structure, we need to rely on the estimated group structure Gˆ.
For any fixed D and a preliminary estimate of group structure Gˆ, we can obtain the bias-corrected
estimator Θ¯bc(D Gˆ) = (¯bc1 (1)0   ¯bc ()0)0 Let
Πˆ = diag(ˆ1  ˆ)⊗ 2 and Kˆ (D) = Lωˆ(D)−1Ωˆ(D)ωˆ(D)−1L0
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where
ωˆ(D) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ˆ1(1 1)
. . .
ˆ( )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ and Ωˆ(D) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ωˆ11(1 1)
. . .
Ωˆ1( )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
We can construct the sup-Wald test statistic W = supD∈Γ  (D), where
 (D) =  · Θ¯bc(D Gˆ)0Πˆ12L0
³
Kˆ (D)
´−1
LΠˆ12Θ¯bc(D Gˆ)
Let  () = 1√
P
∈G0
P
=1{() − 1
P
=1[()]}. Let () be a zero mean
Gaussian process with covariance kernel Ω( ∗) Let K(D) = Lω(D)−1Ω(D)ω(D)−1L0 S(D) =
Lω(D)−1S(D), S(D) = (1(1)0  ()0)0, andQ(D) = Lω(D)−1Q(D)Π12L0, whereΠ =diag(1
 )⊗ 2 ,
Q(D) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1(1 01)
. . .
( 0)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , Ω(D) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ω11(1 1)
. . .
Ω1( )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  and
ω(D) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1(1 1)
. . .
( )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
To state the next theorem, we add one assumption.
Assumption A.7: For each  ∈ G  ()⇒ () on the compact set Γ where⇒ denotes the
usual weak convergence.
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic distribution of our sup-Wald test statistic
under H1 
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that Assumptions A.1(i.1) and (ii)—(v), and A.2—A.7 hold. Then under
H1 : LΘ0 = c√ , we have
W → sup
D∈Γ
 c (D) 
where  c (D) = £S(D) +Q(D)c¤0 [K(D)]−1 £S(D) +Q(D)c¤.
Under H0, c = 0 and 0 ≡ supD∈Γ  0(D) = supD∈Γ S(D)0 [K(D)]−1 S(D). Clearly, the
limiting null distribution of W depends on the Gaussian process S(D) and is not pivotal. We
cannot tabulate the asymptotic critical values for the above sup-Wald statistic. Nevertheless, given
the simple structure of S(D) we can follow the literature (e.g., Hansen 1996) and simulate the
critical values via the following procedure:
1. Generate {  = 1    = 1  } independently from the standard normal distribution;
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2. Calculate Sˆ (D) = 1√ˆ
P
∈Gˆ
P
=1 ˜()ˆ();
3. Compute W∗ ≡ supD∈Γ Sˆ(D)0ω(D)−1L0[Kˆ (D)]−1Lωˆ(D)−1Sˆ(D);
4. Repeat Steps 1—3  times and denote the resulting W∗ test statistics as W∗ for  =
1  
5. Calculate the simulated/bootstrap -value for the W test as ∗ = 1
P
=1 1{W∗ ≥
W} and reject the null when ∗ is smaller than some prescribed level of significance.
The above discussion was based on the m.d.s. condition in Assumption A.1(i.1). If we con-
sider the case of static panels such that Assumption A.1(i.2) holds, then the covariance kernel
is given by Ω( ∗) = lim( )→∞ 1
P
∈G0
P
=1
P
=1[˜()˜(∗)0] for  ∈ G. Now,
the above simulation procedure needs to be modified because Sˆ (D) constructed in Step 2 will
not mimic the Gaussian process S(D) in this case. Instead of generating the independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal random variables {} in Step 1, we can gener-
ate  = (1   )0 independently from a zero mean multivariate normal distribution with the
variance-covariance matrix Σ = {} given by  = [1− (|− |  )]1 (|− | ≤  ) for some 
such that 1 + 3 → 0. Then

h
Sˆ (D)Sˆ (D)0
i
=
1
ˆ
X
∈ˆ
X
=1
X
=1
( −  )˜()˜()ˆ()ˆ()
where (·) denotes the expectation conditional on the sample  ≡ {  ,  = 1    =
1  } and  () = [1− ||  ]1 (|| ≤  ). Apparently, [Sˆ (D)Sˆ (D)0] converges in
probability to Ω( ) and the modified simulation procedure will generate statistics that follow
the same asymptotic distribution as that of W .
In practice, we frequently consider testing the presence of threshold eﬀects in all  groups, that
is, testing H0 : 01 =  = 0 = 0 In this case, L =  ⊗  and we can readily rewrite our Wald
statistic W as
W = sup
(1)∈Γ
X
=1
 ¡¢ ≡Wsum 
where  ¡¢ = ˆ · ¯bc ¡¢0 [Kˆ ()]−1¯bc ¡¢  Kˆ () = ˆ( )−1Ωˆ1( )
×ˆ( )−10 and ¯bc
¡¢ = ¯bc ¡¢  Here,  ¡¢ is the Wald statistic used for testing
whether 0 = 0 for the th group. For this reason, we can also refer to W as a sup-sum-type of
Wald statistic (Wsum ). Alternatively, we can also consider a sup-sup-type of Wald statistic:
Wsup = sup
1≤≤
sup
∈Γ
 ¡¢ 
Following the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can readily find the limiting null distribution of Wsup  As
before, when we allow for serial correlation in the error terms, we should use Ωˆ2 in place of Ωˆ1
and modify the simulation procedure correspondingly to obtain the simulated -values. We will
compare the performance of Wsum with that of Wsup via simulations in Section 7.
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6 Determining the Number of Groups
In practice, the true number of groups 0 is typically unknown. In this case, we can consider a
BIC-type information criterion (IC) to determine the number of groups. Following BM (2015) and
SSP (2016), we consider the following IC:
() = ln(ˆ2()) +  (6.1)
where ˆ2() = ( )−1Q(Θˆ() Dˆ() Gˆ()) where we make the dependence of Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ on the
group number  explicit, and  is a tuning parameter that plays the role of ln( )( ) in
the standard BIC for linear panel data models. The estimated number of groups is given by
ˆ = argmin
∈{1max}
()
where max is an upper bound for 0 that does not grow with ( )  Following the arguments in
SSP (2016), we can readily show that Pr(ˆ  0) → 0 provided  =  (1) under the standard
condition that ˆ2() → 2()  2 whenever   0. This implies that ˆ ≥ 0 w.p.a.1. As in
BM (2015), it is diﬃcult to further show that Pr(ˆ = 0) → 1 as ( ) → ∞ without further
restrictions given the use of the K-means-type iterative algorithm in our estimation procedure.
On the other hand, if we require each estimated group should contain a minimum proportion 
of individuals (e.g.,  = 005),1 then we can show that when   0 the threshold parameters and
slope coeﬃcients can also be estimated consistently and it is possible to show that ˆ2()−ˆ2(0) =
(−1) under some conditions stated in the online supplement. In this case, a choice of  such
that  ·  → ∞ as ( )→ ∞ would help to eliminate the over-selected model. Then we can
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold. Suppose that Assumptions D.1-D.2 in the
online supplement holds. Then Pr(ˆ = 0)→ 1 as ( )→∞
Theorem 6.1 shows that the use of the IC helps to determine the correct number of groups
w.p.a.1. SSP and Liu et al. (2018) propose a similar IC to ours. SSP also require that  → 0
and  → ∞ as ( ) → ∞ for general nonlinear models but remark that this condition can
be relaxed substantially for linear panel data models. In contrast, Liu et al. (2018) require that
 → 0 and  12(1+) → ∞ for some   0 which is much stronger than our requirement on
  The main reason is that they consider general nonlinear regression models and do not explore
the properties of their objective function. They suggests using the tuning parameter  ³ −14,
which satisfies our theoretical requirement but tends to be too large to be useful in practice. In the
simulations in the next section, we find that by setting  = 01 ln ( )  the above IC works
fairly well in determining the true number of groups.
1 If a group contains less than bc members, the members in this group can be merged into other groups.
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7 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section we evaluate the finite sample performance of our tests and estimates via a set of
Monte Carlo experiments.
7.1 Data generation processes
We consider three main cases. The first two cases concern static panels with diﬀerent error struc-
tures, and the third case examines the dynamic panel. In each case, we consider two subcases that
diﬀer regarding whether the threshold value is group specific or common across individual units.
Thus, we have six data generating processes (DGPs) in total.
DGP 1: We generate the data from the following static panel structure model:
 =  + 11( ≤ ) + 21(  ) +  (7.1)
where  = −1P=1 , and we generate  from an i.i.d. standard normal distribution. The
slope coeﬃcient vector  = (01  02)0 has a group pattern of heterogeneity with the number of
groups  = 3, and it is specified as
(11 12 13) = (1 175 25) and (21 22 23) = (1 175 25) + 1( )−01
where 1 controls the size of the threshold eﬀect and we set 1 = 1 if not especially mentioned. Let
 be the proportion of units in group  for  = 1 2 3, and we fix the ratio of units among groups
such that 1 : 2 : 3 = 03 : 03 : 04. The threshold variable  follows i.i.d. (1 1). The error
term  is heteroskedastic, generated as  = , where  = (+ 012)12, with  controlling
for the signal-to-noise ratio, and  ∼ i.i.d. (0 1). We set  = 05, leading to 2 of about 0.85.
Let D = (1 2 3)0. We consider two subcases: group-specific and homogeneous threshold value,
i.e.
DGP 1.1 : D = (05 1 15)0 DGP 1.2 : D = (1 1 1)0
DGP 2: This is the same as DGP 1 except that the error term is generated from an autoregressive
process,
 = 04−1 +   ∼ i.i.d. (0 1)
As above, we consider two subcases, with group-specific and homogeneous threshold values, and
we label these two subcases DGP 2.1 and DGP 2.2, respectively.
DGP 3: In this case, we consider dynamic panel data models,
 =  + (1  1)1( ≤ ) + (2  2)1(  ) +  (7.2)
where  = (−1 )0 and  = −1P=1 . The slope coeﬃcient of −1 is set as
(11 12 13) = (02 04 06) and (21 22 23) = (02 04 06) + 2( )−01
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with 2 = 14 if not especially mentioned. The slope coeﬃcient  , the threshold variable , and
the error term  are all generated in the same manner as that in DGP 1. We likewise consider
two subcases with diﬀerent types of threshold values, and we label them DGP 3.1 and DGP 3.2.
For each DGP, we consider two cross-sectional sample sizes,  = (50 100), and two time series
periods,  = (30 60), leading to four combinations of cross-sectional and time series dimensions.
The number of replications is set to 1000 for the estimation and 500 for the hypothesis testing.
7.2 Determining the number of groups
As both of our testing and estimation procedures require specifications of the number of groups,
we first examine the accuracy of the IC in determining the number of groups, measured by the
empirical probability of selecting a particular number. The proposed IC is calculated by assuming
the presence of the threshold eﬀect. Nevertheless, researchers typically do not have prior knowledge
of the existence of the threshold eﬀect, and tests for the threshold eﬀect in turn require the input
of the number of groups. Therefore, we examine the performance of IC for the PSTR model in
both scenarios with and without the threshold eﬀect (1 = 1 and 2 = 14 in the former case and
1 = 2 = 0 in the latter). In practice, we need to choose an appropriate  for the information
criterion. We experiment with many alternatives and find that  = 01 ln( ) works fairly
well.
TABLE 1 around here.
Table 1 displays the empirical probability of selecting a particular number of groups in the three
DGPs, and the highest probability in each case is highlighted in bold. The left panel displays the
selection frequency when there is no threshold eﬀect but only group-specific slope coeﬃcients, and
the right panel considers the cases in the presence of the threshold eﬀect. In both cases, our IC
can select the correct number of groups with a large probability, more than 96% in all cases, and
this probability increases as either  or  increases. This result suggests that the proposed IC can
correctly determine the number of groups regardless whether the there is a threshold eﬀect, and
this further allows us to implement tests and estimation given the true number of groups.
7.3 Test for the existence of threshold eﬀect
Next, we investigate the performance of the two Wald statistics (Wsum and Wsup ) to test the
existence of a panel structure threshold eﬀect at three conventional significance levels, namely,
1%, 5%, and 10%. These tests are evaluated given the correct number of groups, say 0 = 3. We
examine the performance of the tests under both homogeneous and heterogeneous threshold eﬀects.
However, prior to the test, one is typically ignorant whether the threshold is heterogeneous across
groups. Hence, we implement our tests assuming that the threshold is group specific. To facilitate
computation and avoid ill behavior for the test statistic, we truncate the top and bottom 10% of
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the threshold values and use the grid {11% 12%     89%}. The critical values for the two test
statistics are simulated based on  = 600 replications.
TABLEs 2 and 3 around here.
Table 2 presents the rejection frequency of the two tests when the threshold is group specific.
The left panel presents the size of the test, i.e. the rejection frequency under the null hypothesis
with 1 = 0 in DGP 1 and 2 and 1 = 2 = 0 in DGP 3. Since the classification is based on
the discrepancy of slope coeﬃcients, heterogeneity in the threshold does not contribute to group
separation. Hence, the size of both tests is generally well controlled. We find that both tests tend
to be oversized when  = 50 and  = 30, but the sizes improve when either  or  increases.
The middle panel shows the power of the tests in the presence of a weak threshold eﬀect (1 = 15,
2 = 115). Both tests demonstrate non-trivial power in detecting the threshold eﬀect, and for the
fixed DGP and nominal level, the power function monotonically increases as either dimension of
the sample size grows. Finally, the right panel considers a stronger threshold eﬀect with 1 = 12
and 2 = 110. We find that the rejection frequency of both tests increases as the threshold eﬀect
increases, and it reaches 1 with large samples.
Table 3 considers the case in which the threshold is homogeneous across groups. Again, both
tests demonstrate reasonably good size and power properties. We find that both tests tend to
over reject the null hypothesis when there are indeed no threshold eﬀects, especially when  = 30.
As  increases, the rejection frequency approaches the nominal level under the null. Under the
alternative hypothesis, the rejection frequency in the presence of homogeneous thresholds seems to
be higher than that in case of heterogeneous thresholds. This arises potentially because we estimate
the threshold for each group, ignoring the feature of homogeneity. The ineﬃciency of threshold
estimates may inflate the rejection frequency.
7.4 Test for homogeneity of threshold parameters across groups
If there exists a threshold eﬀect, the next issue is whether the threshold is common for individuals.
We test the homogeneity of the threshold using the LR-based statistic discussed in Section 4.2.
As above, we use the grid {11% 12%     89%} to facilitate the computation. To estimate 2,
we employ the nonparametric method detailed in Section 4.2 and follow Hansen (2000) in using
the Epanechnikov kernel and the bandwidth selected according to a minimum mean square error
criterion. The rejection frequency is displayed in Table 4.
TABLE 4 around here.
The left panel of Table 4 presents the rejection frequency under the null hypothesis of homoge-
neous thresholds with D = (1 1 1)0. The size of the test statistic is generally close to the nominal
levels in all DGPs, except that it is undersized for the 10% level test in DGP 2 and 3. The mid-
dle panel reports the rejection frequency under the alternative hypothesis of weakly heterogeneous
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threshold values, i.e., D = (085 1 115)0; the right panel considers the case in which the thresh-
old is strongly heterogeneous, i.e., D = (05 1 15)0. As the degree of heterogeneity increases, we
observe a stable increase in the power function. The power is also increasing as either  or 
increases for the fixed degree of heterogeneity and nominal level. This indicates that our test has
reasonably good power in detecting the heterogeneity of threshold values.
7.5 Estimation results
Finally, we consider the estimation of the PSTR model in the case of both homogeneous and group-
specific thresholds. When the thresholds are expected to be common across groups, we impose an
equality restriction for threshold estimation, but we still allow group-specific slope coeﬃcients. We
evaluate the performance of the proposed method with respect to three aspects: clustering, slope
coeﬃcient estimates, and threshold estimates. The accuracy of classification is measured by the
average of the misclassification frequency (MF) across replications, defined as
MF =
1

X
=1
1(ˆ 6= 0 )
For slope coeﬃcient estimates, we focus on the bias, root mean squared error (RMSE), and coverage
probability (CP) of the two-sided nominal 95% confidence interval, while the threshold parameter
estimates are evaluated based on the bias, coverage probability, and average confidence interval
length. In the dynamic panels (DGP 3), the evaluation is based on the bias-corrected slope coeﬃ-
cient estimates.
TABLE 5 around here.
Table 5 presents the average misclassification rate across replications. In general, the method
can correctly estimate the group membership, and the misclassification rate decreases quickly as
 increases. In the static panel with heteroskedastic error (DGP 1), PSTR can correctly classify
at least 96% of individuals when  = 30 and roughly 99.7% when  = 60. When the errors are
serially correlated (DGP 2), PSTR can correctly estimate the group membership for more than 90%
of individuals in the worst case. Allowing for dynamics does not deteriorate the good performance
of classification, and the misclassification rate remains low in all cases. Interestingly, we find that
the misclassification rate is lower in the case of homogeneous threshold parameters than in the
case of group-specific thresholds. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that group
identification requires the separation of group-specific slope coeﬃcients instead of heterogeneity
among the threshold parameters.
TABLEs 6—8 around here.
Next, we examine the estimates of the slope coeﬃcients and threshold parameters, and the
results are presented in Tables 6—8. In each DGP, the slope coeﬃcients can be accurately estimated
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with a small bias, and the coverage probability is generally close to the 95% nominal level. Again,
allowing for group-specific thresholds leads to poorer slope and threshold estimates. We find that
when the threshold is group specific in DGP 2.1, the RMSE of the slope estimates sometimes
decreases disproportionally faster than the speed of the increase in  . This occurs because the
relatively large misclassification rate in DGP 2.1 is remarkably reduced by increasing  , and precise
classification contributes to better slope estimates.
The threshold parameter is also estimated accurately in all cases, and the average length of
the confidence interval shrinks as both  and  increase. We find that the average length of
the confidence interval is generally much smaller in the case of a homogeneous threshold than the
group specific threshold. This suggests that pooling does improve the eﬃciency of the threshold
estimation for common threshold groups.
8 Empirical Applications
We illustrate our procedure through two empirical applications. Our first application examines
the investment decision of firms in the presence of financing constraints using the popular data
of Hansen (1999). As a second application, we examine the impact of bank deregulation on the
distribution of income using the historical data of US states.
8.1 Investment and financing constraints
We first apply the proposed PSTR estimator to revisit the question whether capital market im-
perfections aﬀect firms’ investment behavior. An influential and seminal study by Fazzari et al.
(1988) suggests that firms’ investment is associated with its cash flow only when the firm is con-
strained by external financing. To investigate the threshold eﬀect of financial constraints, Hansen
(1999) examines three investment determinants, i.e., Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and leverage, allowing
the impact of cash flow to vary depending on whether a firm is financially constrained. This study
assumes that firms are all homogeneous, such that they face the same threshold parameters and
share a common eﬀect of determinants. A number of evidence, however, has shown that firms be-
have heterogeneously in their financial activities, including investment decisions (see, for example,
Spearot (2012), Bernard et al. (2007), and Foster et al. (2008)). Heterogeneity may occur not
only in the eﬀect of financial variables on investment (even after diﬀerentiating constrained and
unconstrained firms), but also in threshold parameters. Firms with diversified characteristics may
be subjected to distinct threshold levels.
Thus motivated, we revisit the determinants of investment and consider the following model
 =  + 1−11(−1 ≤ ) + 2−11(−1  ) +  (8.1)
where  is the ratio of investment to capital and  denotes the firm fixed eﬀect. We follow
Lang et al. (1996) and Hansen (1999) to consider the potential determinants  = (  ),
where  is Tobin’s Q,  is the ratio of cash flows to capital, and  denotes leverage.  is
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Figure 1: The information criterion for determining the number of groups in the investment and
financial constraint application
the threshold variable, which we specify as Tobin’s Q, cash flow, or leverage, all of which proxy for
a certain degree of financial constraints. The lagged values of ,  , and  are used as regressors
and threshold variables to avoid possible endogeneity (see also Hansen (1999) and González et
al. (2005)). This model allows a time-invariant group pattern of heterogeneity in both slope
coeﬃcients and the threshold parameter as well as time-varying heterogeneity depending on the
realization of the threshold variable. We use the same data set as Hansen (1999) that contains 565
firms over 15 years.
To estimate (8.1), we first determine the number of groups chosen based on the IC. Figure 1
displays the value of the IC when we choose the number of groups ranging from 1 to 8 under the
three specifications of the threshold variable. For each given number of groups, we estimate the
parameters in (8.1) based on 1000 initializations. The IC selects four groups when we use cash
flow and Tobin’s Q as the threshold variable, while it suggests five groups when leverage is used.
We next test the existence of threshold eﬀects using Wsum and Wsup defined in Section 5. Both
tests (based on 600 bootstrap replications) suggest the presence of threshold eﬀects for the three
specifications of the threshold variable, and the common-threshold test tends to reject the null
hypothesis of homogeneity in all cases.
TABLE 9 around here.
Table 9 summarizes the estimation results of (8.1) with three specifications of the threshold
variable. When we specify the threshold variable as Tobin’s Q, the estimates of the threshold are
10.721, 2.800, 0.854, and 0.282 for the four groups, such that 93%, 87%, 56%, and 15% of the sample
fall below the threshold in each group, respectively. In most groups, both Tobin’s Q and cash flow
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are positively associated with investment, as expected. Leverage generally has a negative impact
on investment, and this impact is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. This
result supports the over-investment hypothesis that leverage serves as a disciplining device that
prevents firms from over-investing (see, e.g., Jensen (1986) and Seo and Shin (2016)). Group 1
is characterized by relatively low average investment but high average Tobin’s Q, while firms in
Group 2 are mostly undervalued but still invest aggressively. Group 3 contains very “unsuccessful”
firms with highest average leverage as well as lowest average cash flow and Tobin’s Q. By contrast,
Group 4 is featured by the highest average cash flow and Tobin’s Q but lowest average leverage,
indicating that firms in this group can be well operated and active in the market. The estimated
thresholds for both Groups 1 and 2 occur at the upper quantiles, whereas the eﬀects of cash flow and
leverage diﬀer remarkably across the two groups. The eﬀect of cash flow is strongly and positively
significant for overvalued firms in Group 2 but less clear for the same type of firms in Group 1.
When Tobin’s Q is below the threshold, the leverage eﬀect is stronger for firms in Group 2 than
for firms in Group 1. For the very “unsuccessful” firms in Group 3, investment is more sensitive to
Tobin’s Q and cash flow compared with Groups 1 and 2. This is in line with the expectation that
the marginal benefit from extra cash and a high asset value is especially high for firms that lack
financial resources. Most firms in Group 4 are “successful”, with average Tobin’s Q greater than 1.
For a few firms in this group that are severely undervalued and thus financially constrained, both
the positive impact of Tobin’s Q and negative impact of leverage are pronounced.
Next, we examine the case in which we use cash flow as the threshold variable. Again, we find a
large degree of heterogeneity in the estimates of threshold parameters and slope coeﬃcients. Group
1 contains the burgeoning firms with the largest average cash flow and Tobin’s Q. Most firms in this
group fall below the lower threshold regime, with significantly positive eﬀects of Tobin’s Q and cash
flow and a negative eﬀect of leverage. The threshold eﬀect in Group 2 is particularly prominent,
since the impact of Tobin’s Q and cash flow on investment is much stronger for cash-constrained
firms than for unconstrained firms. We find that the eﬀects of Tobin’s Q and cash flow are both
negative and sizable for extremely cash-constrained firms in Group 3. Further examination reveals
that such firms may borrow money to expand, such that they still invest aggressively when they
face a shortage of cash flow. This also explains a large positive eﬀect of leverage when they are
cash constrained.
Finally, we use leverage as the threshold variable. In this case, the IC suggests five groups.
The first three groups share the same threshold at zero, but the slope coeﬃcient estimates diﬀer.
Firms in Groups 1 and 2 generally have a low investment level, but firms in Group 1 are mostly
overvalued, while those in Group 2 are often undervalued. When these firms have non-zero debt,
their investment is positively aﬀected by their cash flow and Tobin’s Q. The investment behavior
of Group 3 is more sensitive to cash flow than that of Groups 1 and 2. Group 4 contains a number
of overvalued firms with large cash flow, and the negative eﬀect of leverage on investment in this
group is particularly strong in comparison with that of other groups. Group 5, as an extra group,
emerges in this case because of seven firms with especially high investment. Such firms also have
an abundance of cash and well-valued assets. These are possibly the aggressive firms, for which we
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find a strong and positive impacts of cash flow and leverage on investment.
In general, we find a large degree of heterogeneity across firms, which is potentially driven
by unobserved firm characteristics, such as their market performance, investment strategy, and
managerial risk-taking behavior. Such heterogeneity cannot be captured by conventional threshold
regressions. The group pattern varies to some extent for diﬀerent specifications of the threshold
variable. This suggests that the three candidate threshold variables capture distinct aspects of
financial constraints.
8.2 Bank regulation and income distribution
Our second application concerns the relationship between bank regulation and the distribution
of income. Bank regulation plays a crucial role in governing the financial market. It subjects
banks to certain restrictions and guidelines regarding, for example, bank mergers, acquisitions, and
branching, in the hope of creating a transparent environment for banking institutions, individuals,
and corporations. Bank regulations generally consist of two components: (1) licensing that sets
requirements for starting a new bank and (2) governmental supervision of the bank’s activities.
Hence, with stiﬀer regulations, there could be fewer banks in operation in the market, and banking
activities can be more restricted. In shaping regulation policies, income inequality is always one
of the central concerns. There exists a theoretical debate on the impact of bank regulation on the
distribution of income. On the one hand, imposing stiﬀer regulatory restrictions on bank mergers
and branching is likely to create and protect local banking monopolies, which further leads to
higher fixed fees that hurt the poor. Thus, the main motivation for deregulation is to intensify
bank competition and improve bank performance. On the other hand, objection on deregulation
is also raised due to the fears that centralized banking power would discriminatively curtail the
financial opportunities of the poor (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) and thus amplify inequality.
We revisit the relationship between bank regulation, particularly branch deregulation, and the
distribution of income by applying the PSTR estimator. This analysis was first undertaken by
Beck et al. (2010) using US state-level data in a standard (fixed eﬀects) panel framework. We
employ the same data set that covers 49 US states for 31 years from 1976 to 2006.2 The impact of
branch deregulation may vary remarkably across states depending on their financial market situa-
tions, economic performance, demographic features, and so forth. For example, Beck et al. (2010)
suggested that the impact of bank deregulation is more prominent if bank performance prior to
deregulations is more severely hurt by intrastate branching restrictions. Moreover, deregulation
may disproportionately aﬀect diﬀerent income groups that are characterized by heterogeneous de-
mographic features, and its impact on the distribution of income could also diﬀer across states
depending on their economic and financial market performance.
To model the heterogeneous impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income, we
consider the panel structure threshold model as follows:
 =  + (1 + 1)1( ≤ ) + (2 + 2)1(  ) +  (8.2)
2The dataset contains 50 US states and the District of Columbia but excludes Delaware and South Dakota.
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where  represents the distribution of income, which is measured by the logistic transformation
of the Gini coeﬃcient following Beck et al. (2010) and  denotes the state fixed eﬀect.3  is
a dummy variable that equals one if a state has implemented deregulation and zero otherwise,
and the date of deregulation refers to that on which a state permitted branching via mergers and
acquisitions. The control variables in  include two salient and robust demographic determinants
of income inequality based on the cornerstone study of Beck et al. (2010), namely, the percentage
of high school dropouts (Dropout) and the unemployment rate (Unemp). We consider four specifi-
cations of the threshold variable : the two demographic variables in the covariates (Dropout and
Unemp), the initial share of small banks, and the initial share of small firms. Obviously, these two
demographic variables allow us to examine the potentially heterogeneous impact of deregulation,
which depends on the demographic features of the state. The initial share of small banks reflects
the degree of bank competition at the date of deregulation, which may disproportionately deter-
mine the impact of deregulation. The initial share of small firms also plays a role in influencing
the impact of deregulation because the barriers to obtaining credit from distant banks is greater
for small firms than for larger firms, leading to a heterogeneous impact across states with diﬀerent
initial shares of small firms. To analyze the eﬀect of the two share variables, we have to use a
subsample of the data with 37 states if we wish to have a balanced panel. Detailed information on
the dataset and its source can be found in Beck et al. (2010).
The moderate eﬀect of the two initial share variables was first proposed and analyzed by Beck
et al. (2010) in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) framework. The advantages of (8.2) compared
to the conventional DiD approach are as follows: (1) DiD can only report a positive or negative
(linear) eﬀect of the moderating variables, (e.g., the same value for all levels of the initial share of
small firms), while PSTR provides information on how such an eﬀect varies (possibly non-linearly)
across diﬀerent levels of these variables; (2) DiD captures only observed heterogeneity that is driven
by the moderating variables, while PSTR allows us to model the unobserved heterogeneity as the
group pattern is fully unrestricted.
We first examine the optimal number of groups chosen by the IC. Figure 2 displays the value of
IC when we choose the number of groups ranging from 1 to 8 under four specifications of threshold
variables. The IC robustly chooses two groups as the optimal specification in all cases. The -values
of Wsup and Wsum suggest that the impact of explanatory variables does exhibit threshold eﬀects
for all four specifications of the threshold variable, although to diﬀerent extents.
TABLE 10 around here.
Table 10 presents the estimated threshold and eﬀects of the explanatory variables. In general,
we find a large degree of heterogeneity both across groups and across diﬀerent levels of the threshold
variables. We first examine the impact of deregulation if we specify the threshold variable as the
rate of high school dropouts. In this case, the test for the common threshold rejects the null of
3We also consider alternative measures of the distribution of income, such as the logarithm of the Gini coeﬃcients
and Theil index, and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
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The number of groups
-4.7
-4.6
-4.5
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-4.3
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 Dropout rate
 Unemployment
 Ratio of small banks
 Ratio of small firms
Figure 2: The information criterion for determining the number of groups in the bank deregulation
application
Figure 3: Estimates of the group memebership of US states ( = 2)
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homogeneity with -value 0.03; thus, we allow the threshold coeﬃcient to vary across groups in our
estimation. The estimation is based on 10000 initial values, and the same number of initializations
is used for the estimation with other threshold variables below. Our method assigns 26 states into
Group 1 and 23 states into Group 2. Interestingly, the classification coincides with the geographic
location to some extent (see Figure 3). Group 1 contains mainly coastal states, such as Washington,
Oregon, California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Vermont, Virginia, and Florida. These
states are generally characterized by good economic performance and active financial markets.
Group 2 contains states with less active financial markets, including mostly inland and Southeastern
states, such as Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, North and South Carolina,
and Georgia. The two groups are distinguished by the eﬀects of covariates and the threshold. The
estimated threshold of Group 1 is 0.295, such that 73% of observations fall below the threshold. The
eﬀect of deregulation on income inequality is significantly negative (−00291) when the dropout
rate is below the threshold, and it is of a similar size as reported by Beck et al. (2010) (see
column (1) of Table II of Beck et al. (2010)). Nevertheless, this eﬀect becomes insignificant when
the dropout rate is particularly high. For Group 2, the estimated threshold is much smaller with
1.5% of the sample in the lower threshold regime, and a majority of the sample in this group
report a significantly negative impact of deregulation on inequality. Compared with Group 1, the
inequality reduction induced by deregulation is much less sizeable in Group 2. This is possibly
because bank competition is disproportionately intensified by deregulation in coastal states than in
inland/south-eastern states, leading to better bank performance and further to a larger reduction
in income inequality.
Next, we examine the deregulation eﬀect when we specify the threshold variable as the unem-
ployment rate. The -value of the common-threshold test is 0.01, strongly favoring the hypothesis
of the heterogeneous threshold coeﬃcients. The group pattern estimated in this case is closely in
line with the specification above, with only two states (Ohio and Wyoming) switching their group
memberships. We again find a large degree of heterogeneity across the two groups. The estimated
thresholds are 9.8 for Group 1 and 2.6 for Group 2, which leads to about 95% and 10% of the
sample below the threshold, respectively. The impact of deregulation on inequality is significantly
negative for the majority of the sample in both groups but insignificant for the minority. These
results suggest that branching deregulation can reduce income inequality in most states, but the
magnitude of reduction is bigger in Group 1. However, for the states with an extreme unemploy-
ment and dropout rate, deregulation does not significantly help reduce inequality and even enlarges
inequality.
To explicitly examine how the degree of bank competition influences the impact of deregulation,
we consider the threshold variable as the initial share of small bank. Owing to the unavailability of
the initial share in some states, we employ a subsample of the data with 37 states. In this case, the
test for the common threshold strongly suggests homogeneity; thus, we proceed with the estimation
imposing the homogeneity restriction. The states are again classified into coastal and inland/south-
eastern groups with only four states (Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and West Virginia)
switching their group memberships compared with the case of the dropout rate being the threshold
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variable. This confirms the heterogeneity of geographic locations and demonstrates the robustness
of the estimated group pattern. The estimated threshold is 0.1723 for both groups (due to the
common-threshold restriction), such that most observations are in the lower threshold regime. The
impact of deregulation is negative in all groups and all regimes, but the magnitude of inequality
reduction is larger when the share is beyond the threshold in both groups. This result is in line
with the expectation that states with a comparatively high ratio of small banks benefit more from
eliminating branching restrictions, as such restrictions that protect small banks from competition
have been particularly harmful to bank operations. Since most states are in the lower threshold
regime in both groups, we see that the magnitude of inequality reduction induced by deregulation
is larger for the majority in Group 1 than the majority in Group 2 as in the previous states.
Finally, we consider the potential threshold eﬀect induced by the initial share of small firms.
Again, the test for the common threshold fails to reject the null of homogeneity; thus, we estimate
the model restricting the two groups to share the same threshold. The estimated group pattern
remains highly similar to the above case using the initial share of small banks as the threshold
variable, with only one state changing its group membership. The estimated threshold in both
groups is in the 0.783 quantile of the initial share of small firms. Interestingly, when we specify the
threshold variable as the two initial-share variables, the estimated slope coeﬃcients in Group 1 are
close or even identical. This is, of course, due to the robustness of the classification; moreover, it
implies that the two share variables result in similar sample thresholding for Group 1. However,
sample thresholding by the two share variables diﬀers in Group 2, and the impact of deregulation
is not significant in Group 2 when we use the initial shares of small firms as the threshold variable.
In both groups, the inequality reduction is more sizable when the initial share of small firms is
beyond the threshold. This confirms the theoretical argument that the impact of deregulation is
more pronounced in states with a large ratio of small firms before deregulation, since the existence
of branching restrictions impedes the growth of small firms that typically face greater barriers to
obtaining credit from distant banks and thus enlarges inequality (Beck et al., 2010).
To summarize, the PSTR estimates provide at least two new important insights that are not
provided by standard panel data models with interaction terms. First, we find a large degree of
heterogeneity between the two groups even after controlling for the threshold eﬀect, and the impact
of deregulation is more sizeable in the group containing most coastal states. This result is robust
regardless of the way in which we specify the threshold variable. The group structure coincides
with the geographic locations to some extent but not precisely, and this latent group pattern is
diﬃcult, if not impossible, to recover using standard panel data approaches. Second, we find a
clear threshold eﬀect in each of the two groups. The degree of inequality reduction induced by
deregulation depends on the demographic features and the composition of financial markets. Such
a group pattern heterogeneity and nonlinear feature of threshold eﬀects can be simultaneously
captured by our PSTR model but not by the conventional DiD approach.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the least squares estimation of a panel structure threshold regression
(PSTR) model, where both the slope coeﬃcients and threshold parameters may exhibit latent
group structures. We summarize the practical procedure of using this model as follows. The
procedure starts with selecting the right number of groups using the IC. With the number of
groups given, we first test the presence of threshold eﬀects using the two proposed Wald-type
statistics. If there are threshold eﬀects, we then need to test whether the threshold coeﬃcients also
vary across groups. Next, we can proceed with the estimation with or without the homogeneity
of thresholds imposed, depending on the results of the common-threshold test. We show that we
can consistently estimate the latent group structure and estimators of the slope and the threshold
coeﬃcients are asymptotically equivalent to the infeasible estimators that are obtained as if the
true group structures were known. Moreover, the standard inference based on LR test statistic can
provide a correct coverage for the group-specific threshold parameters.
There are several interesting topics for further research. First, we only allow individual fixed
eﬀects in our PSTR model. It is possible to also allow for fixed time eﬀects in the model, but
this will complicate the analysis to a great deal. Second, it is very interesting but challenging to
study the PSTR model with interactive fixed eﬀects, which can incorporate strong cross-sectional
dependence in many macro or financial data. Third, we do not allow the latent group structures to
change over time. It is interesting and extremely challenging to study PSTR models with a time-
varying latent group structure. Fourth, as mentioned in the introduction, we can also consider a
PSTR model with endogenous regressors and threshold variables and latent group structures, which
would require the use of GMM-type estimation. Fifth, one can also consider a PSTR model with
multiple thresholds or multiple threshold variables by extending the works of Li and Ling (2012)
and Seo and Linton (2007) to the panel setup with or without latent group structures.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we prove the main results in the paper. The proofs rely on some technical lemmas
whose proofs can be found in Appendix B of the online supplement. They also call on some other technical
lemmas in Appendix C of the online supplement.
A Proofs of the main results
To prove Theorem 3.1, we first need three technical lemmas, viz, Lemmas A.1—A.3 below. To state these
lemmas, we define some notation. First, we introduce the following auxiliary objective function:
Q˜(ΘDG) =
X
=1
X
=1
h
˜0(00 − ) + ˜(00 )000 − ˜()
i2
+
X
=1
X
=1
˜2 (A.1)
Lemma A.1 shows that the distance between Q˜(ΘDG) and Q(ΘDG) is (1) uniformly in (ΘDG)
so that we can study the asymptotic properties of Θˆ through Q˜(ΘDG) in Lemma A.2. Now, define the
Hausdorﬀ distance  : B × B →  as follows
( ) ≡ max
½
max∈G
µ
min˜∈G k − ˜k
¶
 max˜∈G
µ
min∈G k − ˜k
¶¾

Lemma A.1. Suppose that Assumption A.1 holds. Then sup(ΘDG)∈B×Γ×G 1 |Q(ΘDG)−Q˜(ΘDG)|
= (1)
Lemma A.2. Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.3 hold. Then (ΘˆΘ0) → 0 as ( )→∞
Remark. The proof of Lemma A.2 shows that there exists a permutation Θˆ such that
°°°ˆ − 0Θˆ()°°° =
(1)We can take Θˆ() =  by relabeling. In the following analysis, we shall write ˆ−0 = (1) without
referring to the relabeling any more.
Lemma A.3. Let ˆ(ΘD) = argmin∈GP=1 £˜ − ˜()0¤2  Suppose Assumptions A.1—A.3 hold. For
some   0 small enough and ( ) large enough such that max∈G °°0°° ≤ √, we have
Pr
Ã
sup
(ΘD)∈N×Γ
"
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 )
#!
= (−4)
where N =
n
Θ ∈ B : °° − 0°°2    ∈ Go 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma A.2, we have (Θˆ Dˆ) ∈ N × Γ. Therefore, we can conclude that
1

P
=1 Pr(ˆ 6= 0 ) = (−4) by Lemma A.3. Hence, we have
Pr
µ
sup

1
¡ˆ 6= 0 ¢ = 1¶ ≤ X
=1
Pr(ˆ 6= 0 ) =  · (−4) = 
¡−4¢  ¥
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need Lemmas A.4—A.7.
Lemma A.4. Suppose  is any random variable with 1
P
 kk3+ ≤  for some constant   0
and   0. Suppose Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold. Then
°°° 1 P=1P=1 1(ˆ 6= 0 )°°° = (( )−1)
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To state the next lemma, we define an auxiliary estimator Θˇ(D) ≡ (ˇ1(1)0  ˇ()0)0, which is the
least squares estimator of Θ with fixed D and true group specification G0, that is,
ˇ() =
⎛
⎝X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜()0
⎞
⎠
−1⎛
⎝X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()˜
⎞
⎠ for  ∈ G
Then the infeasible estimator is given by Θˇ = Θˇ(Dˇ) with Dˇ = argminD∈Γ Qˇ(Θˇ(D)D). See also (3.1)
in Section 3.1. In the online Supplementary Material we derive the asymptotic properties of Θˇ. The next
lemma establishes the asymptotic equivalence by exploiting the properties of infeasible estimators.
Lemma A.5. Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold. Then ( ) → ∞ we have ˆ = ˇ(ˆ) +
(( )−1) for all  ∈ G.
Lemma A.6. Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold and  ∈ (0 13). Then  (ˆ − 0) = (1) for
all  ∈ G.
Lemma A.7. Suppose that Assumptions A.1—A.5 hold. For any  = 0 + (1 ) and  ∈ G, the
following statement holds:
ˇ()− ˇ(0) = (( )−12) and ˇ(ˇ() )− ˇ(ˇ ) = (1).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. For the first result, we can show
√ [ˇ(ˆ) − ˇ] → 0 by Lemmas A.5—
A.7. It suﬃces to show the second result. Given Lemma A.6, we can denote ˆ ≡ 0 + ˆ and
ˇ ≡ 0 + ˇ . Let
∗∗ () ≡ ˇ(ˇ(ˆ) 0)− ˇ(ˇ(ˆ) 0 +  ) and (A.2)
∗ () ≡ ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ 0 +  ) (A.3)
First we show that ∗∗ () − ∗ () → 0 uniformly on any compact set Ψ. It is straightforward to
calculate that
∗∗ ()−∗ () = ∗ ()−  ()
where  () is a remainder term that is defined in Lemma C.14 in the online Supplementary Material and
∗ () can be defined analogously. We show in the proof of Lemma C.14 that ∗ () → 0 uniformly on
any compact set Ψ Similar arguments can be used to show that ∗ () → 0 uniformly on any compact
set Ψ. Therefore, we have ∗∗ ()−∗ () → 0 uniformly on any compact set Ψ.
Next, we have
∗∗ (ˆ) = ˇ(ˇ(ˆ) 0)− ˇ(ˇ(ˆ) 0 + ˆ )
= ˇ(ˇ 0)−
£ˇ(ˇ(ˆ) 0 + ˆ ) + (1)¤
= ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ 0 + ˇ ) + (1)
= ∗ (ˇ) + (1)
= max∈ 
∗ () + (1)
where the first and second equalities hold by (A.2) and Lemma A.7, respectively, the fourth equality holds
by (A.3) and the fact that ˇ = ˇ(ˇ) and the last equality follows from the definition of ˇ On the other
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hand side, ∗∗ (ˆ) = ∗ (ˆ)+(1) by the uniform convergence of ∗∗ ()−∗ () in probability
to zero. It follows that
∗ (ˆ) = max∈ 
∗ () + (1)
Noting that ∗ (·) converges weakly to a continuous stochastic process that has a unique maximum and
ˇ = argmax∈∗ () we must have
ˆ = argmax∈ 
∗ () + (1) = ˇ + (1)
which implies  (ˆ − ˇ) = (1). ¥
Lemma A.8. Suppose Assumptions A.1(ii)—(vi) and A.3—A.6 hold. Let M0 =  − 1  0 with  being a
 × 1 vector of ones.
(i) Under Assumption A.1(i.1) we have 1√
P
∈G0 (0)0M0+
q

 B (0) → (0Ω01) where
B (0) = 1
P
∈G0
P
=1
P

£(0)¤ for each  ∈ G;
(ii) Under Assumption A.1(i.2) we have: 1√
P
∈G0 (0)0M0
→ (0Ω02) where Ω2(0 0) is
as defined in Assumption A.6.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (i) By Theorem 3.2, we only need to consider the infeasible estimator Θˇ. By
Lemma A.7, we have thatp (ˇ − 0) = p (ˇ(0)− 0) + (1)
=
⎛
⎝ 1
X
∈G0
(0)0M0(0)
⎞
⎠
−1
1p
X
∈G0
(0)0M0 + (1)
Then the result follows from Lemma A.8 and Assumption A.6.
(ii) The result follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma C.14 in the online supplement. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4.1. First, using Lemma A.3, we can readily show that ˆ → 1 and ˇ(ˇ ˇ)( )→ 2. Let ¯() be the minimizer of ¯( ) that is defined in Section 4.1. Following the proof of Lemma
A.5, we can also show that ¯(0) = ˇ
¡0¢+ (( )−1) With this and using Lemma A.4, we can readily
show that
¯(¯(0) 0) = ¯(ˇ
¡0¢  0) + (1) = ˇ(ˇ(0) 0) + (1) (A.4)
On the one hand, by the definitions of (ˇ ˇ) and {(ˆ ˆ)  = 1  }, we have
ˇ(ˇ ˇ) ≤ ˇ(ˆ ˆ) and
X
=1
¯(ˆ ˆ) ≤
X
=1
ˇ(ˇ ˇ)
On the other hand, we can apply Lemma A.4 to show that
¯( ) = ˇ( ) + (1) (A.5)
This, in conjunction with the first inequality in the above displayed equation implies that ˇ(ˇ ˇ) ≤
¯(ˆ ˆ) + (1) and hence P=1 ˇ(ˇ ˇ) ≤ P=1 ¯(ˆ ˆ) + (1) Combining this last inequality
with the second inequality in the above displayed equation yields
X
=1
ˇ(ˇ ˇ) =
X
=1
¯(ˆ ˆ) + (1)
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which, in conjunction with ˇ(ˇ ˇ) ≤ ¯(ˆ ˆ) + (1) for each  ∈ G, implies that
¯(ˆ ˆ) = ˇ(ˇ ˇ) + (1) (A.6)
Noting that ˇ(0)−0 = [P∈G0 (0)0M0(0)]−1P∈G0 (0)0M0 and using the analysis of ˇ−0
in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can readily show that ˇ(0) − ˇ = (1
√ ) With this, we can also
show that
ˇ(ˇ(0) 0)− ˇ(ˇ 0) = (1) (A.7)
Then we have
¯(¯(0) 0)− ¯(ˆ ˆ) = ˇ(¯(0) 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ) + (1)
= ˇ(ˇ(0) 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ) + (1)
= [ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ)] + [ˇ(ˇ(0) 0)− ˇ(ˇ 0)] + (1)
= ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ) + (1) (A.8)
where the first equality follows from (A.5) and (A.6), the second and last equalities hold by (A.4) and (A.7),
respectively.
By Lemma C.14 in the online Supplementary Material, we have
ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ  + 0)⇒ −2  ||+ 2
q
 2 ()
where  ≡ 00 00 and  ≡ 00  0 0 . Then by the continuous mapping theorem (CMT),
ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ + 0) ⇒ max∈
h
−2  ||+ 2
q
 2 ()
i
=

 max∈
⎡
⎣−
2

¯¯2 ¯¯+ 2
s
22
 ()
⎤
⎦
=

 max∈
"
−
¯¯¯¯
¯2 2 
¯¯¯¯
¯+ 2(2 2 )
#
=

 max∈ [− ||+ 2()]  (A.9)
where the second equality holds by the distributional equality () = (2) and the last equality
follows from the change of variable (by setting  ≡ 2 2 ).
Lastly, we have
L
¡0¢ = ¯(¯(0) 0)− ¯(ˆ ˆ)¯(ˆ ˆ)( ) = ˇ(ˇ 
0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ + 0)
ˇ(ˇ ˇ)( )
+  (1)
→ 2 max∈ [− ||+ 2()] 
where the first equality holds by (A.8) and (A.6), and the convergence follows from (A.9) and the fact that
ˇ(ˇ ˇ)( ) = 2 +  (1)  ¥
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Under the null hypothesis, one can study the asymptotic property of (Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)
similar to that of (Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ). Following the arguments as used in the proof of Lemma A.5, we can show that
(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) = ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ) + (1)
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where Dˇ = argminD∈D ˇ(Θˇ(D)D). This, in conjunction with the fact that(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) = ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ)+(1)
implies that
(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)−(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) = ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ)− ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ) + (1)
=
£ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ)− ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ)D0)¤+ £ˇ(ΘˇD0)− ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ)¤
+
£ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ)D0)− ˇ(ΘˇD0)¤+ (1)
=
£ˇ(ΘˇD0)− ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ)¤− £ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ)D0)− ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ)¤+ (1)
where we use the fact that ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ)D0) − ˇ(ΘˇD0) = (1) that can be proved by following the same
arguments as used to derive (A.7).
For ˇ(ΘˇD0)− ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ), we have that under 02 : D0 ∈ D (i.e., 01 =  = 0 = 0)
ˇ(ΘˇD0)− ˇ(Θˇ Dˇ) =
X
=1
£ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ ˇ + 0)¤ = X
=1
∗ (ˇ)
⇒
X
=1

 max∈
"
−
¯¯¯¯
¯2 2 
¯¯¯¯
¯+ 2(2 2 )
#
=
X
=1

 max∈ [− ||+ 2()]
by Lemma C.13 in the online supplement. Writing Dˇ = (0 + ˇ   0 + ˇ )0, we have that
under 02 : D0 ∈ D
ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ)D0)− ˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ) =
X
=1
£ˇ(ˇ(Dˇ) 0)− ˇ(ˇ(Dˇ) 1−2 ˇ + 0)¤
=
X
=1
∗ (1−2 ˇ)
⇒ max∈
Ã X
=1


"
−
¯¯¯¯
¯2 
¯¯¯¯
¯+ 2(2 )
#!
= max∈
Ã X
=1


∙
−
¯¯¯¯
1
2
 
¯¯¯¯
+ 2(1
2
 )
¸!

where the last equality is obtained by changing variable  =  · 21. This completes our proof. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4.3. This proof is analogous to the first half of that of Theorem 4.2 and thus omitted.
¥
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Following the arguments as used in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the Wald test
statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the infeasible Wald test statistic uniformly for D. Therefore, we can
focus on the study of the asymptotic property of the infeasible Wald test statistic. To avoid introducing new
notations, we just assume Gˆ = G0, which occurs w.p.a.1. Then ¯bc () = ˇbc () w.p.a.1., where ˇbc () is
the bias-corrected version of ˇ() when necessary (e.g., in the dynamic case) and ˇ() is defined before
Theorem 3.2. Similarly, let Θˇbc(D) be the bias corrected version of Θˇ(D) when necessary
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For  ∈ G, we can readily establish
p hˇbc ()− 0i =  ( )−1 1p X∈G0
X
=1
˜()[˜(0)− ˜()]00
+ ( )−1 () + (1)
Note that  ( ) → ( ) uniformly in  by Assumption A.6 and  () ⇒ () on Γ by
Assumption A.7. In addition, by Assumption A.6,
1p X∈G0
X
=1
˜()[˜(0)− ˜()]00 = √ 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜()[˜(0)− ˜()]00
=
√ 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
£˜()˜(0)0 − ˜()˜()0¤0
→√ £( 0)− ( )¤0
where the convergence follows by Assumption A.6. Then under H1 : LΘ0 = c√pˇbc () ⇒ p0 + ( )−1 ©() +√ £( 0)− ( )¤0ª
=
√ + ( )−1[() +√( 0)0]−√0
= ( )−1[() +√( 0)0]
Then by the CMT, we can conclude that
√LΠˆ12Θˇbc(D) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p1ˇbc1 (1)
...p ˇbc ( )
⎞
⎟⎟⎠⇒ Lω(D)−1
h
S(D) +Q(D)Π12L0c
i

It is standard to show that Kˆ (D)
→ Lω(D)−1Ω(D)ω(D)−1L0 uniformly in D. Then we have  ()⇒
 () by the CMT. ¥
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Using Theorem 3.2 and the analysis of the infeasible estimators in Section C of the
online supplement, we can readily show that ˆ2 ¡0¢ → 2 as ( )→∞ Then (0) = ln ¡ˆ2 ¡0¢¢+
0 → 2 by Assumption D.2(ii) in the online supplement, where 2 =lim( )→∞ 1
P
=1
P
=1(2)
When 1 ≤   0, by Assumption D.2(ii) we have that w.p.a.1. () = ln ¡ˆ2 ()¢+ ≥ ln(¯2) 
ln(2) as ( )→∞ So we have
Pr(ˆ  0) = Pr(∃1 ≤   0 ()  (0))→ 0 as ( )→∞ (A.10)
Next, we consider the case where 0   ≤ max. When   0, we have by Proposition D.1 in the
online supplement that max0≤max [ˆ2 ()− ˆ2(0)] = (−1) It follows that
Pr(ˆ  0) = Pr(∃0   ≤ max ()  (0))
= Pr(∃0   ≤ max  [ln(ˆ2 ())− ln(ˆ2(0))]  (−0) )
→ 0 as ( )→∞ (A.11)
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where the last line follows from the fact that  [ln(ˆ2 ()) − ln(ˆ2(0))] =  ln(1 + ˆ2()−ˆ2(0)ˆ2(0) ) =
( (ˆ2 () − ˆ2(0)) =  (1) and  → ∞ as ( ) → ∞ by Assumption D.2(ii). Combining
(A.10) and (A.11), we have Pr(ˆ = 0)→ 1 as ( )→∞ ¥
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Table 1: Group number selection frequency using IC when 0 = 3
No threshold eﬀect With threshold eﬀect
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
DGP 1.1 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.967 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.976 0.024 0.000
50 60 0.000 0.000 0.972 0.026 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.997 0.003 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
DGP 1.2 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.974 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.976 0.024 0.000
50 60 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
DGP 2.1 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.016 0.002
50 60 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
DGP 2.2 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.994 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.946 0.032 0.022
50 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.997 0.003 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
DGP 3.1 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
50 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
DGP 3.2 50 30 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 0.006 0.000
50 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
100 30 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000
100 60 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2: Rejection frequency of test for existence of threshold eﬀect: Heterogeneous thresholds
No threshold eﬀect Weak threshold eﬀect Strong threshold eﬀect
(1 = 0, 2 = 0) (1 = 1/5, 2 = 115) (1 = 1/2, 2 = 110)
  1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
Wsup
DGP 1.1 50 30 0.026 0.072 0.122 0.096 0.228 0.332 0.728 0.833 0.923
50 60 0.006 0.044 0.088 0.160 0.304 0.496 0.918 0.985 1.000
100 30 0.016 0.050 0.084 0.160 0.308 0.436 0.923 0.980 0.993
100 60 0.010 0.044 0.080 0.276 0.512 0.606 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 2.1 50 30 0.036 0.094 0.138 0.108 0.202 0.308 0.533 0.755 0.878
50 60 0.008 0.058 0.088 0.096 0.240 0.332 0.760 0.923 0.943
100 30 0.024 0.074 0.120 0.126 0.294 0.332 0.788 0.930 0.968
100 60 0.010 0.044 0.080 0.140 0.342 0.442 0.968 0.993 0.998
DGP 3.1 50 30 0.024 0.070 0.150 0.160 0.306 0.444 0.826 0.942 0.970
50 60 0.012 0.050 0.106 0.260 0.526 0.642 0.992 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.018 0.062 0.118 0.212 0.492 0.610 0.984 0.998 1.000
100 60 0.006 0.058 0.086 0.520 0.770 0.868 1.000 1.000 1.000
Wsum
DGP 1.1 50 30 0.030 0.076 0.148 0.152 0.276 0.376 0.853 0.915 0.968
50 60 0.012 0.042 0.086 0.224 0.358 0.544 0.980 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.020 0.060 0.102 0.244 0.398 0.554 0.985 0.995 1.000
100 60 0.016 0.044 0.080 0.378 0.622 0.686 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 2.1 50 30 0.042 0.106 0.154 0.148 0.260 0.342 0.673 0.855 0.928
50 60 0.016 0.056 0.090 0.122 0.274 0.382 0.880 0.963 0.980
100 30 0.032 0.112 0.186 0.216 0.418 0.450 0.925 0.973 0.980
100 60 0.012 0.060 0.086 0.244 0.436 0.530 0.995 1.000 1.000
DGP 3.1 50 30 0.012 0.064 0.098 0.178 0.312 0.436 0.888 0.962 0.986
50 60 0.004 0.030 0.080 0.302 0.574 0.668 0.996 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.014 0.054 0.094 0.272 0.528 0.654 1.000 0.998 1.000
100 60 0.004 0.036 0.068 0.596 0.798 0.886 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3: Rejection frequency of test for existence of threshold eﬀect: Homogeneous thresholds
No threshold eﬀect Weak threshold eﬀect Strong threshold eﬀect
(1 = 0, 2 = 0) (1 = 1/5, 2 = 115) (1 = 1/2, 2 = 110)
  1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
Wsup
DGP 1.2 50 30 0.024 0.072 0.118 0.126 0.356 0.434 0.818 0.964 0.990
50 60 0.006 0.044 0.088 0.164 0.408 0.526 0.984 0.996 1.000
100 30 0.016 0.050 0.095 0.208 0.400 0.512 0.978 0.996 1.000
100 60 0.010 0.044 0.085 0.412 0.635 0.734 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 2.2 50 30 0.032 0.076 0.138 0.090 0.220 0.360 0.692 0.926 0.948
50 60 0.016 0.066 0.118 0.140 0.282 0.404 0.906 0.986 0.994
100 30 0.020 0.068 0.116 0.122 0.330 0.440 0.908 0.982 0.996
100 60 0.012 0.052 0.096 0.264 0.474 0.620 0.998 0.998 0.998
DGP 3.2 50 30 0.024 0.094 0.174 0.256 0.474 0.626 0.940 0.990 1.000
50 60 0.008 0.066 0.118 0.454 0.700 0.804 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.012 0.086 0.134 0.398 0.670 0.730 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 60 0.007 0.056 0.104 0.740 0.906 0.966 1.000 1.000 1.000
Wsum
DGP 1.2 50 30 0.029 0.076 0.140 0.198 0.400 0.454 0.962 0.992 0.996
50 60 0.012 0.042 0.086 0.300 0.508 0.672 0.998 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.018 0.060 0.114 0.362 0.540 0.652 0.998 1.000 1.000
100 60 0.015 0.044 0.086 0.620 0.780 0.881 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 2.2 50 30 0.034 0.076 0.154 0.146 0.322 0.408 0.912 0.970 0.980
50 60 0.008 0.070 0.124 0.190 0.400 0.548 0.986 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.041 0.099 0.156 0.298 0.442 0.566 0.990 0.996 1.000
100 60 0.014 0.056 0.096 0.394 0.628 0.734 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 3.2 50 30 0.012 0.068 0.138 0.324 0.520 0.626 0.990 1.000 1.000
50 60 0.006 0.036 0.070 0.560 0.760 0.816 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.010 0.064 0.090 0.480 0.734 0.816 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 60 0.008 0.044 0.088 0.860 0.982 0.992 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 4: Rejection frequency for the test of homogeneous thresholds
Threshold Homogeneous Weakly heterogeneous Strongly heterogeneous
 = [1 1 1]  = [085 1 115]  = [05 1 15]
  1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
DGP 1 50 30 0.013 0.076 0.110 0.810 0.904 0.960 0.968 0.980 0.994
50 60 0.018 0.061 0.114 0.994 0.986 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 30 0.014 0.064 0.096 0.990 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 60 0.012 0.046 0.112 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
DGP 2 50 30 0.014 0.034 0.052 0.344 0.592 0.690 0.116 0.312 0.408
50 60 0.010 0.038 0.056 0.862 0.950 0.948 0.498 0.710 0.808
100 30 0.010 0.052 0.058 0.844 0.932 0.956 0.498 0.714 0.794
100 60 0.008 0.042 0.050 0.994 0.998 1.000 0.920 0.970 0.994
DGP 3 50 30 0.006 0.040 0.064 0.936 0.972 0.900 0.692 0.856 0.900
50 60 0.010 0.046 0.048 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.968 0.994 0.998
100 30 0.006 0.042 0.066 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.972 0.992 0.998
100 60 0.010 0.036 0.040 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 5: Average misclassification rate
 = 50  = 100
 = 30  = 60  = 30  = 60
DGP 1.1 0.0365 0.0032 0.0316 0.0026
DGP 1.2 0.0203 0.0011 0.0179 0.0013
DGP 2.1 0.0963 0.0141 0.0697 0.0124
DGP 2.2 0.0509 0.0076 0.0470 0.0075
DGP 3.1 0.0041 0.0001 0.0028 0.0000
DGP 3.2 0.0011 0.0000 0.0015 0.0002
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Table 6: Estimates of coeﬃcients and threshold values: Heteroskedastic error (DGPs 1.1-1.2)
1 2 
DGP 1.1: 0= (05 1 15)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 −0001 0.078 0.908 −0002 0.056 0.915 0009 0.958 0.549
 = 30 Group 2 0003 0.097 0.895 0015 0.107 0.893 0018 0.923 0.373
Group 3 0002 0.078 0.920 0004 0.103 0.890 0001 0.960 0.545
 = 50 Group 1 −0004 0.052 0.925 0000 0.035 0.940 0002 0.963 0.214
 = 60 Group 2 −0001 0.042 0.925 −0001 0.042 0.928 0002 0.965 0.202
Group 3 −0003 0.037 0.948 −0001 0.055 0.913 0000 0.973 0.246
 = 100 Group 1 0001 0.055 0.922 −0002 0.038 0.898 −0003 0.966 0.245
 = 30 Group 2 0004 0.045 0.920 0000 0.048 0.904 −0003 0.948 0.207
Group 3 0007 0.035 0.928 −0003 0.057 0.922 0001 0.968 0.240
 = 100 Group 1 0003 0.037 0.944 −0002 0.024 0.938 0000 0.972 0.125
 = 60 Group 2 0003 0.030 0.938 −0001 0.029 0.942 −0002 0.970 0.108
Group 3 0000 0.025 0.920 −0004 0.036 0.946 −0004 0.962 0.119
DGP 1.2: 0= (1 1 1)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 0001 0.057 0.938 −0010 0.060 0.928 −0002 0.928 0.073
 = 30 Group 2 −0002 0.064 0.903 −0010 0.060 0.923
Group 3 0006 0.062 0.923 −0011 0.061 0.913
 = 50 Group 1 0004 0.038 0.960 −0003 0.040 0.943 0001 0.933 0.049
 = 60 Group 2 0001 0.043 0.927 −0003 0.043 0.917
Group 3 0004 0.042 0.940 −0003 0.038 0.957
 = 100 Group 1 0001 0.042 0.930 −0009 0.041 0.947 0001 0.940 0.051
 = 30 Group 2 0006 0.045 0.913 −0006 0.041 0.933
Group 3 0006 0.040 0.930 −0011 0.039 0.963
 = 100 Group 1 0003 0.026 0.963 −0002 0.028 0.950 −0001 0.947 0.027
 = 60 Group 2 0005 0.029 0.933 −0002 0.029 0.940
Group 3 0004 0.027 0.953 −0004 0.029 0.943
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Table 7: Estimates of coeﬃcients and threshold values: Autoregressive error (DGPs 2.1-2.2)
1 2 
DGP 2.1: 0= (05 1 15)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 −0014 0.153 0.834 0015 0.163 0.874 0048 0.932 0.797
 = 30 Group 2 −0008 0.198 0.812 0032 0.225 0.802 −0010 0.848 0.605
Group 3 −0024 0.140 0.858 0001 0.203 0.856 −0034 0.936 0.924
 = 50 Group 1 −0008 0.092 0.914 −0001 0.043 0.930 −0006 0.966 0.374
 = 60 Group 2 −0003 0.051 0.924 0002 0.050 0.942 0004 0.964 0.291
Group 3 −0005 0.050 0.922 0005 0.073 0.892 −0014 0.958 0.433
 = 100 Group 1 −0021 0.080 0.894 −0009 0.050 0.882 −0015 0.960 0.380
 = 30 Group 2 −0002 0.076 0.840 0000 0.073 0.856 0003 0.918 0.302
Group 3 0006 0.057 0.880 0013 0.075 0.910 −0003 0.946 0.331
 = 100 Group 1 0002 0.045 0.944 0002 0.031 0.932 0001 0.980 0.195
 = 60 Group 2 −0003 0.037 0.930 0001 0.037 0.934 0002 0.950 0.158
Group 3 −0002 0.031 0.942 0000 0.046 0.940 0000 0.972 0.181
DGP 2.2: 0= (1 1 1)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 −0002 0.067 0.937 −0008 0.074 0.920 0001 0.960 0.181
 = 30 Group 2 0012 0.108 0.877 0000 0.091 0.923
Group 3 0009 0.091 0.917 −0008 0.097 0.927
 = 50 Group 1 0005 0.048 0.965 0000 0.050 0.938 −0001 0.985 0.079
 = 60 Group 2 0001 0.053 0.918 −0002 0.048 0.945
Group 3 0004 0.051 0.930 −0004 0.049 0.955
 = 100 Group 1 −0004 0.053 0.928 −0017 0.061 0.851 −0001 0.950 0.099
 = 30 Group 2 0001 0.056 0.914 −0002 0.057 0.910
Group 3 0019 0.053 0.914 −0002 0.051 0.932
 = 100 Group 1 0001 0.033 0.950 −0005 0.036 0.930 0000 0.980 0.051
 = 60 Group 2 −0001 0.031 0.965 −0001 0.033 0.965
Group 3 0004 0.033 0.965 −0001 0.036 0.920
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Table 8: Estimates of coeﬃcients and threshold values: Dynamic panel (DGPs 3.1-3.2)
1 2 
DGP 3.1: 0= (05 1 15)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 −0007 0.035 0.923 −0010 0.025 0.920 −0006 0.940 0.184
 = 30 Group 2 −0003 0.017 0.963 −0007 0.020 0.907 0003 0.970 0.161
Group 3 −0002 0.012 0.923 −0007 0.019 0.877 −0008 0.947 0.147
 = 50 Group 1 −0003 0.025 0.930 −0005 0.017 0.950 0001 0.973 0.095
 = 60 Group 2 −0002 0.013 0.953 −0003 0.012 0.943 −0002 0.940 0.073
Group 3 −0001 0.007 0.960 −0001 0.011 0.950 0000 0.947 0.073
 = 100 Group 1 −0007 0.027 0.927 −0009 0.019 0.917 0000 0.973 0.110
 = 30 Group 2 −0003 0.014 0.937 −0007 0.015 0.933 0000 0.943 0.082
Group 3 −0002 0.008 0.940 −0005 0.013 0.907 −0002 0.947 0.074
 = 100 Group 1 −0005 0.019 0.923 −0004 0.013 0.927 −0001 0.947 0.059
 = 60 Group 2 −0002 0.009 0.930 −0002 0.009 0.953 0000 0.960 0.044
Group 3 −0001 0.005 0.950 −0003 0.009 0.920 0000 0.967 0.038
DGP 3.2: 0= (1 1 1)0
Bias RMSE CP Bias RMSE CP Bias CP Length
 = 50 Group 1 −0008 0.029 0.957 −0014 0.032 0.910 0001 0.977 0.050
 = 30 Group 2 −0004 0.019 0.930 −0005 0.019 0.910
Group 3 0000 0.012 0.937 −0005 0.013 0.927
 = 50 Group 1 −0003 0.018 0.957 −0005 0.021 0.937 0000 0.950 0.024
 = 60 Group 2 −0002 0.013 0.940 −0002 0.012 0.940
Group 3 −0001 0.008 0.953 −0002 0.009 0.923
 = 100 Group 1 −0008 0.020 0.957 −0010 0.025 0.897 0001 0.983 0.029
 = 30 Group 2 −0002 0.013 0.950 −0006 0.014 0.933
Group 3 0000 0.009 0.953 −0005 0.010 0.893
 = 100 Group 1 −0006 0.017 0.948 −0004 0.018 0.938 0000 0.964 0.201
 = 60 Group 2 −0002 0.011 0.942 −0001 0.012 0.944
Group 3 −0002 0.007 0.958 −0003 0.008 0.922
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Table 9: Investment and financial constraint: Estimated threshold and slope coeﬃcients
Threshold variable Tobin’s Q
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
 (Lower regime %) 10.721 (93%) 2.800 (87%) 0.854 (56%) 0.282 (15%)
1  00081∗∗∗ 00716∗∗∗ 01537∗∗∗ 13450∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0146) (0.0631)
 00918∗∗∗ 00977∗∗∗ 03278∗∗∗ −46433∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0121) (0.0366) (0.1563)
 −00158∗∗∗ −00671∗∗∗ 00206 −08063∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0068) (0.0204) (0.1025)
2  00086∗∗∗ 00134∗∗∗ 00553∗∗∗ −00004
(0.0010) (0.0052) (0.0084) (0.0003)
 −00194∗ 03007∗∗∗ −04886∗∗∗ −00161∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0579) (0.0617) (0.0080)
 00668 00798 01251∗∗∗ −00143∗∗∗
(0.0803) (0.0830) (0.0270) (0.0061)
Threshold variable Cash flow
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
 (Lower regime %) 0.853 (98%) 0.279 (66%) −0084 (1.6%) −0343(0.2%)
1  00013∗∗∗ 01447∗∗∗ −04135∗∗∗ −00034∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0075) (0.0295) (0.0009)
 00684∗∗∗ 01545∗∗∗ −20022∗∗∗ −01496∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0216) (0.0697) (0.0411)
 −00096∗ 00203∗ 526850∗ −02208∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0106) (0.1284) (0.0435)
2  −00010∗∗∗ 00068∗∗∗ 00468∗∗∗ 00117∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0013)
 00806∗∗∗ 00054 −00835∗∗∗ 02958∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0110)
 −00996∗∗∗ 01644∗∗∗ −00399∗∗∗ −00730∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0256) (0.0060) (0.0083)
Threshold variable Leverage
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
 (Lower regime %) 0 (8.5%) 0 (8.5%) 0 (8.5%) 0.002 (8.9%) 0.806 (98%)
1  −00003 00957∗∗∗ 00014 00107∗∗∗ 00538∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0109) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0131)
 00584∗∗∗ −00047 02276∗∗∗ −00519∗∗∗ −08202∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0509) (0.0247) (0.0132) (0.1507)
 −00083 −00297 00816 −08464∗∗∗ 01648∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0566) (0.0549) (0.0637) (0.0337)
2  00039∗∗∗ 00804∗∗∗ 00117∗∗∗ 00003 12055∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.1284)
 00304∗∗∗ 00423∗∗∗ 03854∗∗∗ 01164∗∗∗ −43237∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0133) (0.0163) (0.0086) (0.2463)
 00024 −00535∗∗∗ 00258∗∗∗ −01168∗∗∗ 02734∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0099) (0.0383)
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Table 10: Impact of bank deregulation: Estimated threshold and slope coeﬃcients
Threshold variable Dropout rate Unemployment rate
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
 (Lower regime %) 0.295 (73%) 0.041 (1.5%) 9.80 (95%) 2.60 (10%)
1 Dereg −00291∗∗∗ 02444∗∗∗ −00316∗∗∗ −00228
(0.0082) (0.0576) (0.0080) (0.0427)
Dropout −06749∗∗∗ 33793∗∗∗ −06959∗∗∗ −52629
(0.0778) (0.7635) (0.0805) (3.0658)
Unemp 00032∗ 00390∗ 00007 01566∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0198) (0.0022) (0.0489)
2 Dereg −01672∗ −00199∗∗∗ 00339 −00197∗∗∗
(0.0779) (0.0086) (0.0415) (0.0088)
Dropout −11961∗∗∗ −02286∗∗∗ −04149 −02125∗∗∗
(0.2666) (0.0614) (0.6825) (0.0629)
Unemp 00626∗∗∗ 00263∗∗∗ 00212∗∗∗ 00263∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0022)
Threshold variable Ratio of small banks Ratio of small firms
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
 (Lower regime %) 0.1723 (94.5%) 0.8943 (78.3%)
1 Dereg −00291∗∗∗ −00067 −00354∗∗∗ 00003
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0117)
Dropout −07805∗∗∗ −02432∗∗∗ −08015∗∗∗ −03306∗∗∗
(0.0933) (0.0791) (0.0924) (0.0968)
Unemp 00038 00253∗∗∗ 00030 00244∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026)
2 Dereg −00655 −01555∗∗∗ −00655 −00089
(0.0455) (0.0479) (0.0455) (0.0141)
Dropout 05417∗∗∗ −17011∗∗∗ 05417∗∗∗ −00295
(0.2723) (0.4793) (0.2723) (0.1294)
Unemp 00573∗∗∗ −00008 00573∗∗∗ 00303∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0092) (0.0179) (0.0042)
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°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°2¶ X
˜=1
min[ ( ˜ Dˆ Gˆ)] + (1)
≥ max∈G
µ
min˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°2¶  + (1)
where the last equality follows from Assumption A.2 which says that there exists a group ˜∗ ∈ G such that
min[ ( ˜∗ Dˆ Gˆ)]    0 with probability approaching 1. Consequently, we havemax∈G
³
min˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°´
= (1).
To show (ii), let  () ≡ Θˆ() ≡ argmin˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°  Then by the triangle inequality, we have for any
˜ 6=  °°°ˆ() − ˆ(˜)°°° ≥ °°0 − 0˜°°− °°°ˆ(˜) − 0˜°°°− °°°ˆ() − 0°°° 
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of the last inequality is larger than ˜ by Assumption A.3(a)
and the second and third terms are (1) by the above arguments. Then we can conclude that Θˆ() 6= Θˆ(˜)
w.p.a.1, implying that Θˆ(·) is bijective and has the inverse −1Θˆ . Thus, we have for all ˜ ∈ G,
min∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°° ≤ °°°0−1(˜) − ˆ˜°°° = min∈G °°°0−1(˜) − ˆ°°° = (1)
Therefore we have max˜∈G
³
min∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°´ = (1). This completes the proof of Lemma A.2. ¥
Proof of Lemma A.3. For all  ∈ G, we have
1(ˆ(ΘD) = ) ≤ 1
( X
=1
[˜ − ˜()0]2 ≤
X
=1
[˜ − ˜(0 )00 ]2
)

Thus we have
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 ) =
X
=1
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) = )1(0 6= ) ≤
X
=1
1

X
=1
Z(ΘD)
where
Z(ΘD) ≡ 1(0 6= )1
( X
=1
[˜ − ˜()0)]2 ≤
X
=1
[˜ − ˜(0 )00 ]2
)

For Z(ΘD), we have
Z(ΘD) = 1 ¡0 6= ¢1
( X
=1
h
˜(0 )0(0 − ) + [˜(0 )− ˜()]0
i
×
∙
˜(00 )000 + ˜ −
1
2
[˜()0 + ˜(0 )00 ]
¸
≤ 0
¾
≤ max˜∈G\{}1 (( ˜) ≤ 0) 
3
where
( ˜) =
X
=1
©˜(˜)0(˜ − ) + [˜(˜)− ˜()]0ª {˜(0˜)00˜ + ˜ − 12 [˜()0 + ˜(˜)0˜)]}
By adding and subtracting some terms, we have
( ˜) = (0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜
∙
1
2
˜0(0˜ − 0) + ˜
¸
+ ( ˜) + ( ˜) +  ( ˜)
where
 ( ˜) = [(˜ − 0˜)− ( − 0)]0
X
=1
˜
½
˜(0˜)00˜ + ˜ − 12 [˜()
0 + ˜(˜)0˜)]
¾

 ( ˜) =
X
=1
¡0˜˜(˜)− 0˜()¢0½˜(0˜)00˜ + ˜ − 12 [˜()0 + ˜(˜)0˜)]
¾
 and
 ( ˜) = (0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜
½
˜(0˜)00˜ + ˜ − 12 [˜()
00 + ˜(˜)00˜)]
¾
−(0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜(0˜ − 0)
∙
1
2
˜0(0˜ − 0) + ˜
¸

For  , have
| ( ˜)| ≤
¯¯¯¯
¯[(˜ − 0˜)− ( − 0)]0
X
=1
˜˜
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯[(˜ − 0˜)− ( − 0)]0
X
=1
˜˜(0˜)00˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
+
1
2
¯¯¯¯
¯[(˜ − 0˜)− ( − 0)]0
X
=1
˜(˜()0 + ˜(˜)0˜))
¯¯¯¯
¯
≡ 1( ˜) +2( ˜) +3( ˜)
For 1, we have
1( ˜) ≤ (°°˜ − 0˜°°+ °° − 0°°)
°°°°°
X
=1
˜˜
°°°°°
≤ 2√
Ã°°°°°
X
=1

°°°°°+ 1
°°°°°
X
=1
X
=1

°°°°°
!
≤ 2√
(°°°°° 1
X
=1

°°°°°+
°°°°° 1
X
=1

°°°°°
°°°°° 1
X
=1

°°°°°
)
≤ 4√
Ã
1

X
=1
kk2 + 1
X
=1
2
!
4
where we used the fact that
°° − 0°° ≤ √ for all  ∈ G. Similarly, we have
2( ˜) ≤ 2√ °°0˜°°
°°°°° 1
X
=1
˜˜(0˜)0
°°°°° ≤ 4√ °°0˜°°
Ã
1

X
=1
k˜k2
!
≤ 4√ °°0˜°°
Ã
1

X
=1
kk2
!
 and
3( ˜) ≤ 4√(k˜k+ kk) 1
X
=1
k˜k2 ≤ 4√(k˜k+ kk) 1
X
=1
kk2 
Thus, for any  ∈ N,
| ( ˜)| ≤ 1√
Ã
1

X
=1
(kk2 + 2)
!
≡ 1 
where 1 is a positive constant independent of  and  .
For  ( ˜) we have
| ( ˜)| ≤ (k˜k+ kk) sup∈Γ
°°°°°
X
=1
˜()˜
°°°°°+ 2(k˜k+ kk) sup∈Γ
°°°°°
X
=1
˜(0˜)˜()
°°°°° 
Due to the fact  ∈ N, we have kk ≤ °° − 0°° + °°0°° ≤ 2√ for all  ∈ G Following the analysis of , we can show that
| ( ˜)| ≤ 2√
Ã
1

X
=1
(kk2 + 2)
!
≡ 2 
where 2 is a positive constant independent of  and  . Analogously, we can show that
| ( ˜)| ≤
¯¯¯¯
¯(0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜˜(0˜)00˜
¯¯¯¯
¯+ 12
¯¯¯¯
¯(0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜˜()00
¯¯¯¯
¯+ 12
¯¯¯¯
¯(0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜˜(˜)00˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
≤ 3√
Ã
1

X
=1
(kk2 + 2)
!
≡ 3 
where 3 is a positive constant independent of  and  . It follows that
Z(ΘD) ≤ max˜∈\{}1
Ã
(0˜ − 0)0
X
=1
˜
∙
1
2
˜0(0˜ − 0) + ˜
¸
≤ 
!
≡ Z˜
where  = √ [ 1
P
=1(kk2 + 2)] with  = 1 + 2 + 3 Hence, we can conclude that
sup
(ΘD)∈N×Γ
1

X
=1
1
¡ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 ¢ ≤ 1
X
=1
X
=1
Z˜
Noting that Z˜ does not depend on (ΘD) and  is fixed, we are left to bound Pr(Z˜ = 1).
Observe that
Pr(Z˜ = 1) ≤
X
˜∈\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤ } 
5
where  ( ˜) = (0˜ − 0)0P=1 ˜ £12 ˜0(0˜ − 0) + ˜¤  Letting 4 = 2max(kk2 + 2), we have
Pr(Z˜ = 1) ≤
X
˜∈G\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤ }
≤ X
˜∈G\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤   ≤ 2 ( )}+
X
˜∈G\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤    2 ( )}
≤ X
˜∈G\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤ 2 ( )}+
X
˜∈G\{}
Pr {  2 ( )}
≤ X
˜∈G\{}
Pr { ( ˜) ≤ 4√}+
X
˜∈G\{}
Pr
Ã
1

X
=1
(kk2 + 2) ≥ 4
!

Using the fact (0˜ − 0)0P=1 ˜˜ = (0˜ − 0)0[P=1  − 1 P=1P=1 ] we have
Pr(Z˜ = 1) ≤
X
˜∈G\{}
(
Pr
Ã
1

X
=1
(kk2 + 2) ≥ 4
!
+Pr
Ã
1

X
=1
[˜0(0˜ − 0)]2 ≤ 2
!
+Pr
Ã
(0˜ − 0)0 1
X
=1
 ≤ −
4
+
4
2
√
!
+Pr
Ã
−(0˜ − 0)0 1 2
X
=1
X
=1
 ≤ −
4
+
4
2
√
!)
 (B.1)
By Assumptions A.1 and A.3, we can use Lemma B.1 in the next section to show the first two terms
to be (−4). To study the third term on the RHS of the last inequality, we take  such that  ≤h
min∈G
³
min˜∈G\{} ˜
84
´i2  Then we have that for any  6= ˜ ∈ G,
Pr
Ã
(0˜ − 0)0 1
X
=1
 ≤ −˜
4
+
4
2
√
!
≤ Pr
Ã
(0˜ − 0)0 1
X
=1
 ≤ −˜
8
!
≤ Pr
Ã¯¯¯¯
¯(0˜ − 0)0 1
X
=1

¯¯¯¯
¯ ≥ ˜8
!
= (−4)
where the last equality follows by another application of Lemma B.1 and the fact that
°°0˜ − 0°° ≥   0
under Assumption A.3(i). Similarly, we can show that the last term on the RHS of (B.1) is (−4) Then
we have

Ã
sup
(ΘD)∈N×Γ
1

X
=1
1{ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 }
!
≤ 
Ã
1

X
=1
X
=1
Z˜
!
=
1

X
=1
X
=1
Pr(Z˜ = 1) = (−4)
Lastly, by Markov inequality,
Pr
Ã
sup
(ΘD)∈N×Γ
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 )  −4
!
≤ Pr
Ã
1

X
=1
X
=1
Pr(Z˜ = 1)  −4
!
≤

³
1

P
=1
P
=1 Z˜
´
−4 = (1)
6
for any constant   0. This completes our proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma A.4. By Markov inequality, we have
Pr(sup

kk   ( )13) ≤ 13+ ( )(3+)3
X

 kk3+ =  (1) 
implying that sup kk = (( )13) By Lemma A.3 and the order requirement on  and  , we have°°°°° 1
X
=1
X
=1
1(ˆ 6= 0 )
°°°°° ≤
Ã
sup
(ΘD)∈N×Γ
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 )
!
sup

kk
= (−4( )13) = (( )−1) ¥
Proof of Lemma A.5. By direct calculations, we have
sup
∈Γ
⎛
⎝ 1
X

 k˜()˜()0k4
⎞
⎠ = sup
∈Γ
⎛
⎝ 1
X

 k˜()k8
⎞
⎠ ≤ sup
∈Γ
⎛
⎝ 1
X

 k˜()k8
⎞
⎠
≤ 256
X

 kk8 ≤  ∞ by Assumption A.1(v).
Similarly, sup∈Γ
³
1

P
 k˜()˜k4
´
≤  ∞. Then we apply Lemma A.4 with  = 1 to obtain
1

X
=1
X
=1
1(ˆ = )˜(ˆ)˜ = 1
X
=1
X
=1
1(0 = )˜(ˆ)˜ + (( )−1)
Analogously, we have
1

X
=1
X
=1
1(ˆ = )˜(ˆ)˜(ˆ)0 = 1
X
=1
X
=1
1(0 = )˜(ˆ)˜(ˆ)0 + (( )−1)
To sum up, we have ˆ = ˇ(ˆ) + (( )−1) ¥
Proof of Lemma A.6. Note that
1
 Qˇ(Θˇ(Dˆ) Dˆ) =
1
 Qˇ(Θˆ Dˆ) + (( )
−1) =
1
 Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) + (( )
−1)
≤ 1 Qˇ(Θˇ Dˇ) + (( )
−1)
where the first and second equalities hold by Lemmas A.5 and A.4, respectively, and the inequality holds by
the definition of least squares estimator (Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) On the other hand,
1
 Qˇ(Θˇ Dˇ) =
1
 Qˇ(Θˇ(Dˇ) Dˇ) ≤
1
 Qˇ(Θˇ(Dˆ) Dˆ)
by the fact that Qˇ(ˇ ˇ) = inf() Qˇ( )). It follows that
1

£Qˇ(ˇ(ˇ) ˇ)− Qˇ(ˇ(ˆ) ˆ)¤ = (( )−1), for all  ∈ G. (B.2)
Following the analysis of the infeasible estimator ˇ in Lemma C.10 in the online Supplementary Material,
we can also show that ˆ − 0 = (1 ) based on (B.2). ¥
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Proof of Lemma A.7. For all  ∈ G, we have
ˇ()− 0 = [Φ1()]−1 1
X
∈G0
()0M0 − [Φ1()]−1Φ2()0
where Φ1() ≡ 1
P
∈G0 ()0M0(), Φ2() ≡ 1
P
∈G0 ()0M0( 0) and ( 0) =
()−(0) It is easy to show that
Φ1() = Φ1(0) +(−1 ) = (1)
1

X
∈G0
(0)0M0 = (( )−12 + −1)
1

X
∈G0
£()−(0)¤0M0 = (−1 [( )−12 + −1])
and Φ2()0 = ( )−Φ2()0 = ( )−(−1 ) = (( )−1+) where we use the fact that
 = ( )1−2 and  →   0 With these results, we can readily show that
ˇ()− ˇ(0) =
⎧
⎨
⎩[Φ1()]
−1 1

X
∈G0
()0M0 − £Φ1(0)¤−1 1 X∈G0 (0)0M0
⎫
⎬
⎭
− [Φ1()]−1Φ2()0
=
n
[Φ1()]−1 − £Φ1(0)¤−1o 1 X∈G0 (0)0M0
+ [Φ1()]−1 1
X
∈G0
£()−(0)¤M0 − [Φ1()]−1 Φ2()0
= (−1 [( )−12 + −1]) +(−1 [( )−12 + −1]) +(( )−1+)
= (−1 [( )−12 + −1]) +(( )−1+) = (( )−12)
where the last equality follows from the fact that  ∈ (0 13) and  = ( 2) The above analysis also
shows that ˇ(0)− 0 = 
¡
( )−12 + −1¢.
Next, noting that
ˇ( ) =
X
∈G0
X
=1
[˜ − ˜()0]2 =
X
∈G0
[ − ()]0M0[ − ()]
0M0 −0M0 = ( −)0M0( −) + 2( −)0M0 for any two  × 1 vectors  and  and
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 − () = [()−(0)]0 +  +  with  being a  × 1 vector of ones, we have
ˇ(ˇ() )− ˇ(ˇ ) =
√ [ˇ()− ˇ]0 1
X
∈G0
()0M0()
√ [ˇ()− ˇ]
+2 [ˇ()− ˇ]0 1
X
∈G0
()0M0[()−(0)]0
+2 [ˇ()− ˇ]0 1
X
∈G0
()0M0
=  (1) +(( )−12)(( )−1+)
+ [(−1 [( )−12 + −1]) +(( )−1+)](( )−12 + −1)
=  (1) 
where the last equality follows from the fact that  ∈ (0 13) and  = ( 2). ¥
Proof of Lemma A.8. (i) Let P0 = 1  0  Note that
1p X∈G0 (0)0M0 =
1p X∈G0[(0)− P0((0))]0 (B.3)
− 1p
X
∈G0
X
=1
{(0)−
£(0)¤} ≡ 1 −2
It suﬃces to show that (i1) 1 → (0Ω01) and (i2) 2 =
q

 B +  (1)  To prove (i1), we relabel
the index G0 = {1  } to {1 }. Let  denote a 2 × 1 nonrandom vector with kk = 1 For
 = (−1) +  for  = 1   and  = 1   let  =
h
(0)− 1
P
=1((0))
i
. Let  = 
Then we have
01 = 1√
X
=1
0
Immediately, {}=1 is a martingale diﬀerence sequence (m.d.s.) under the filtration F = ({ : 1 ≤
 ≤ }) the minimal sigma-field generated from { : 1 ≤  ≤ }. Apparently, max1≤≤  kk4 ≤ 
for some  ∞ under Assumption A.1. In addition,
1

X
=1
00
= 0 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
˜(0)˜(0)02
+0 1
X
∈G0
X
=1
2
"
2(0)− 1
X
=1
{(0)−[(0)]}
#"
1

X
=1
{(0)−[(0)}0
#

≡ 11 +12
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By Assumption A.6, 11 → 0Ω1(0 0) For 12, we have by Cauchy-Schwarz and Markov inequalities
|12| ≤ kk2
⎛
⎝ 1
X
∈0
X
=1
4
°°°°°
"
2(0)− 1
X
=1
{(0) +[(0)]}
#°°°°°
2
⎞
⎠
12
×
⎛
⎝ 1
X
∈0
X
=1
°°°°° 1
X
=1
{(0)−[(0)}
°°°°°
2
⎞
⎠
12
=  (1)
³
−12
´
=  (1) 
Then 1 → (0Ω1(0 0)) by the Cramér-Wold device and the martingale central limit theorem.
Next, we consider 2. Note that
2 = 1p X∈G0
X
=1
 £(0)¤+ 1p X∈G0
X
=1
©¡(0)−[(0)]¢  − £(0)¤ª
≡ 21 +22.
For 21, we have 21 =
q


1

P
∈G0
P
=1
P

£(0)¤ = q B  For 22 we can easily
verify that (22) = 0 and
 k22k2 = 1 3
X
∈G0

°°°°°
X
=1
£{(0)−[(0)]} − £(0)¤¤
°°°°°
2
=  ¡−1¢
by using the Davydov inequality for strong mixing processes. Then 22 = (−12) and (i2) follows.
(ii) Now, let  ≡ (0)0M0
p . Then we have  independent across  and
 kk2 = 1
X
=1
X
=1
 ¡˜(0)˜(0)0¢
≤ 1
X
=1
X
=1
6[|− |]12 °°˜(0)°°4 °°˜(0)°°4
= (1)
By Theorem A of Yang (2016), we have max kk2+ ≤ ()−(2+)2maxmax1≤≤ °°˜(0)°°2+2
for some   0 and   ∞. Here k·k = { k·k}1. Then Lindeberg condition holds and we have the
desired claim. ¥
C Supplementary Lemmas
We first state a technical lemma that is also used in the proof the main results in the paper. Then we study
the asymptotic properties of the infeasible estimators.
C.1 A technical lemma
Lemma C.1. Let  denote a  × 1 random vector with mean zero and  kk8+  ∞ for some   0.
Suppose that {  = 1  } is strong mixing process with mixing coeﬃcients  [] ≤  for some   0
and  ∈ (0 1). Then as  →∞ and for any   0 we have
Pr
Ã°°°°° 1
X
=1

°°°°°  
!
= (−4)
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Proof of Lemma C.1. The proof is similar to and simpler than that of Lemma B.1(ii) in Wang, Phillips,
and Su (2018) and thus omitted. ¥
C.2 Asymptotic properties of the infeasible estimators
We present the analysis of infeasible estimator in this section.
Lemma C.2. Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.3(iv) and A.4 hold. For any  ∈ G, we have that
ˇ − 0 = (1) and ˇ − 0 = (( )−)
Proof of Lemma C.2. First, we show the convergence rate of ˇ() for any  ∈ Γ. Let () ≡
([01 011()]0  [0  0 ()]0)0 a ×2 matrix. Let(1 2) ≡ (1[1(1)−1(2)]   [ (1)− (2)])0 a × matrix. By the definition of ˇ(), we have ˇ() = [P∈G0 ()0M0()]−1P∈G0 ()0
M0. It follows that
ˇ()− 0 = [Φ1()]−1 1
X
∈G0
()0M0 − [Φ1()]−1Φ2()0 (C.1)
where Φ1() ≡ 1
P
∈G0 ()0M0(), Φ2() = 1
P
∈G0 ()0M0( 0) By Assumption A.4(i),
Φ1() = (1) for all  ∈ Γ. It is standard to show that 1
P
∈G0 ()0M0 = (( )−12+−1) and
Φ2() = (1). Then we have ˇ()−0 = (( )−+−1) by exploiting the fact that 0 = ((( )−).
Given the fact that   13 and  = ( 2), we can conclude from (C.1) that ˇ() − 0 = (( )−)
and
ˇ()− 0 = − [Φ1()]−1Φ2()0 + (( )−) (C.2)
Next we show the consistency of ˇ. Let Φ3() = 1
P
∈G0 ( 0)0M0( 0). By direct calcu-
lations, we can show that
1

¡Qˇ(ˇ ˇ)− Qˇ(0 0)¢
= 00 Φ3(ˇ)0 + (ˇ − 0)0Φ1(ˇ)(ˇ − 0) + 2(ˇ − 0)0Φ2(ˇ)0
−(ˇ − 0)0 2
X
∈G0
(ˇ)0M0 − ˇ0 2
X
∈G0
(ˇ 0)0M0 (C.3)
Note that the last two terms on the right hand side (RHS) of the above equation are (( )−2). This, in
conjunction with (C.2) and (C.3) implies that,
1

¡Qˇ(ˇ ˇ)− Qˇ(0 0)¢ = 00 [Φ3(ˇ)−Φ2(ˇ)0Φ1(ˇ)−1Φ2(ˇ)]0 + (( )−2)
By Assumption A.4(ii), we have that
Φ3(ˇ)−Φ2(ˇ)0Φ1(ˇ)−1Φ2(ˇ) = ˜(ˇ)
which is a  ×  matrix with minimum eigenvalue min[˜(ˇ)] ≥  min{1
¯¯ˇ − 0 ¯¯} w.p.a.1. Hence it
follows that
( )2−1 ¡Qˇ(ˇ ˇ)− Qˇ(0 0)¢ ≥ 2 °°0°°  min{1 ¯¯ˇ − 0 ¯¯}+ (1)
where we use the fact 0 = ( )− and  →  by Assumptions A.1(vi) and A.2(iii). On the other
hand, we have Qˇ(ˇ ˇ)− Qˇ(ˇ 0) ≤ 0 We can conclude that ˇ − 0 = (1).
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Given the consistency of ˇ, we can easily show that 1
P
∈G0 (ˇ)0M0(0 ˇ) = (1). Then
ˇ − 0 = (( )−) follows. ¥
Lemma C.3. Let (1 2) = kk |(2)− (1)| and (1 2) = kk |(2)− (1)|. Sup-
pose Assumptions A.1(v) and A.5 hold, there is a constant 1  ∞ such that for ≤ 1  2 ≤  and ≤ 4,
max  [(1 2)]
 ≤ 1 |2 − 1| and max  [(1 2)]
 ≤ 1 |2 − 1| 
Proof of Lemma C.3. For any random variable 
 [()] = ( · 1{ ≤ }) =  [1{ ≤ }(|)] =
Z 
−∞
(|)()
where  (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of  with the corresponding PDF (·) Taking
derivative with respect to  on both sides yields

 [()] = (| = )()
Then by the Hölder inequality and Assumptions A.1(v) and A.5

 [kk
 ()] = (kk | = )() ≤ [(kk4 | = )]4()
≤  for some  ∞
This implies that
max  [(1 2)]
 ≤ 1 |2 − 1| with 1 =  
Analogously, we have max [(1 2)] ≤ 1 |2 − 1|  ¥
Lemma C.4. Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then there exists a constant
2 ∞ such that for all ≤ 1  2 ≤  and  ∈ G

¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1p X∈G0
X
=1
¡2(1 2)−2(1 2)¢
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
2
≤ 2 |2 − 1| 

¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1p X∈G0
X
=1
¡2(1 2)−2(1 2)¢
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
2
≤ 2 |2 − 1| 
Proof of Lemma C.4. For notational simplicity, let (1 2) = [(1 2)] for  ≥ 0 By the indepen-
dence across  and strong mixing over  for {(  )}, there is a constant † such that

¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1p X∈G0
X
=1
©2(1 2)−[2(1 2)]ª
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
2
=
1

X
∈G0

¯¯¯¯
¯ 1√
X
=1
©2(1 2)−[2(1 2)]ª
¯¯¯¯
¯
2
≤ 
†

X
∈G0
1

X
=1
 ©2(1 2)− £2(1 2)¤ª2
≤ 
†

X
∈G0
X
=1
 £4(1 2)¤ ≤ †1 |2 − 1| 
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The first result follows by setting 2 = †1 Analogously, we can prove the second result in the lemma. ¥
Lemma C.5. Let  () = −12 −12P∈G0P=1 (). Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—
(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold, there are constants 1 and 2 such that for all ,  ∈ G   0,   0 and
 ≥ ( )−1, if p ≥ 2, then
Pr
Ã
sup
0≤≤0+
| ()−  (0)|  
!
≤ 1
2
4 
Proof of Lemma C.5. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.3 in Hansen (2000). ¥
Lemma C.6. Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.6 hold, we have for  ∈ G,
 ()⇒ ()
a mean-zero Gaussian process with almost surely continuous sample paths.
Proof of Lemma C.6. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.4 of Hansen (2000). ¥
Lemma C.7. Let  () = 1
P
∈G0
P
=100 00 [()− (0)] and  () = 1
P
∈G0P
=1 kk
¯¯()− (0)¯¯. Under Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5, there exist constants  
0, 0   ∞, such that for all   0 and   0, there exists a  ∞ such that for all ( ) and  ∈ G,
Pr
Ã
inf
≤|−0|≤
 ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  (1− )
!
≤ 
Pr
⎛
⎝ sup
≤|−0|≤
 ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  (1 + )
⎞
⎠ ≤ 
Proof of Lemma C.7. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.7 of Hansen (2000). ¥
Lemma C.8: Under Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5, there exists some   ∞ such that for
any  ∞ and  = 1  
Pr
⎛
⎝ sup
≤|−0|≤
¯¯ ()−  (0)¯¯√ ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
⎞
⎠ ≤ 
Proof of Lemma C.8. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.8 of Hansen (2000). ¥
Lemma C.9. Let ˜ () = −1 P∈G0 h−1P=1 kk ¯¯()− (0)¯¯i2 and ˜ () =
−12 −32P∈G0P=1P=1 (()−(0)). Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5
hold. Then there exists some  ∞ and   0 such that for any   0   0 and  ∈ G,
Pr
⎛
⎝ sup
≤|−0|≤
¯¯¯
˜ ()
¯¯¯
√
¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
⎞
⎠ ≤  and Pr
⎛
⎝ sup
≤|−0|≤
¯¯¯
˜ ()
¯¯¯
¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
⎞
⎠ ≤ 
Proof of Lemma C.9. The analysis for the first result is analogous to that of Lemma C.8. For the second
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result, we consider the case   0. Letting () = ( 0) = kk
¯¯()− (0)¯¯  we have
[˜ ()] = −1
X
∈G0

"
−1
X
=1
kk ¯¯()− (0)¯¯
#2
= −1
X
∈G0

"
−1
X
=1
()
#2
= −1
X
∈G0
Var
"
−1
X
=1
()
#2
+−1
X
∈G0
Ã
1

X
=1
[()]
!2
≤ †−1
X
∈G0
−2
X
=1
 £()2¤+−1 X
∈G0
Ã
1

X
=1
[()]
!2
≤ 
†1

¯¯ − 0 ¯¯+ 21 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯2 
where the first inequality follow from the fact that Var
h
−1P=1 ()i2 ≤ †−2P=1Var[()] ≤
†−2P=1[()]2 for some †  ∞ by using the fact that {()  ≥ 1} is also a strong mixing
process, and the last inequality follows from Lemma C.2.
First we consider the case  − 0  0. Choose a   1   ( − 1)(4213) and  such that
  . We set  = 0 + −1 for  = 1   + 1 such that  + 1 ≥  and  ≤ . Since

 ≤ ,  ≤ log( ). When ( ) is large enough„ we can have 
†1

 ≤ 4. Then we can
calculate
Pr
Ã
sup
1≤≤
˜ (+1)¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
!
≤
X
=1
[˜ (+1)]
 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
≤
X
=1
†1 ¯¯+1 − 0 ¯¯ 
 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ +
X
=1
21
¯¯+1 − 0 ¯¯2
 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
=
†1


 +
212

(+1 − 1)
 (− 1)
≤ 
†1


 +
213


(− 1)  2
For any  ∈ [0 +   0 +], there exists a  ∈ {1  } such that  ≤  ≤ +1. In view of the fact
that ˜ () is monotonic in , we have ˜ ()|−0| ≤
˜ (+1)
|−0| . It follows that
Pr
⎛
⎝ sup
≤−0≤
¯¯¯
˜ ()
¯¯¯
¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
⎞
⎠ ≤ Pr
Ã
sup
1≤≤
˜ (+1)¯¯ − 0 ¯¯  
!
≤ 2
A symmetric argument gives us the proof for the case − ≤  − 0 ≤ − . This completes our proof.
¥
Lemma C.10. Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then we have  (ˇ −
0) = (1) for all  ∈ G.
Proof of Lemma C.10: Let    be the coeﬃcients defined in Lemma C.6-C.8 and  = °°0°°  Pick an
 such that min{1  }    0 and 2 (1− ) − 24  − 2 (6 + 42)  0 Let E be the joint
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event that, for all  ∈ G: ¯¯ˇ − 0 ¯¯ ≤ , ( ) °°ˇ − 0°° ≤ , ( ) °°ˇ − 0°° ≤ ,
inf
≤|−0|≤
 ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ ≥ (1− )
sup
≤|−0|≤
 ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ ≤ (1 + )
sup
≤|−0|≤
¯¯ ()−  (0)¯¯√ ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ ≤ 
sup
≤|−0|≤
¯¯¯
˜ ()
¯¯¯
√
¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ ≤ 
sup
≤|−0|≤
˜ ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ ≤ 
Then by Lemma C.7-C.9.Let( 0) ≡ (1[1()−1(0)]   [ ()− (0)])0 a × matrix. Let
∆X ≡ X( 0) ≡
©( 0)  ∈ G0ª  which is an  × matrix. Let () ≡ ([01 011()]0 
[0  0 ()]0)0 a  × 2 matrix. Let Z() ≡
©()  ∈ G0ª  which is an  × 2 matrix. Let
∆X = ( ⊗ P0)∆X , and Z(0) = ( ⊗ P0)Z(0) where recall that P0 = −1 0 . Let  =
(1   )0 and ε = ©  ∈ G0ª  an  × 1 vector.
ˇ ( )− ˇ ( 0) = 0∆X0( ⊗M0)∆X − 20∆X0( ⊗M0)Z(0)( − 0)
+20∆X0( ⊗M0)ε
= 00 ∆X0∆X00 + ( − 0)0∆X0∆X( + 0)− 0∆X∆X
−20∆X0Z(0)( − 0) + 20∆X0Z(0)( − 0) + 20∆X0ε
−20∆X0ε
Let ˇ = ( )− for some  such that °° − 0°° ≤  implied by E . Suppose that E happens
and for  ∈ [0 +   0 +], we have
( )2−1 ˇ (ˇ )− ˇ (ˇ 
0)¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
=
2 00 ∆X0∆X0
 ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ + 
2 ( + 0 )0∆X0∆X( − 0 )
( ) ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ − 
2  0∆X∆X
( ) ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
−2
 0
h
∆X0Z(0)−∆X0Z(0)
i
( )(ˇ − 0)
( ) ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ + 2°°°° ∆X
0ε −∆X0ε
( )1− ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
≥ 
2  ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ − 2 (°°0°°+ °°0°°)°° − 0°°  ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ − 2 kk2 ˜ ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
−4 kk ( )
°°ˇ − 0°°  () + ˜ ()¯¯ − 0 ¯¯ − 2°°°°
¯¯ ()−  (0)¯¯√ ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
−2°°°°
¯¯¯
˜ ()
¯¯¯
√
¯¯ − 0 ¯¯
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≥ 2 (1− )− 2 (2+ )(1 + ) − 2 (+ )2 − 4 (+ )[(1 + ) + ]
−4 (+ )
 2 (1− )− 24  − 2 (6 + 42)
 0
which indicates that ˇ does not belong to [0 +   0 +]. A symmetric argument shows that if E
happens ˇ does not belong to [0 − 0 −   ]. Hence, we have shown ˇ − 0 = (1 ) for all ∈ G. ¥
Lemma C.11. Let ∗ () =  (0 +  ) and ∗ () =  (0 +  ).
Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then we have that uniformly in  ∈ Ψ,
∗ () →  ||  and ∗ () → 0 ||
where  = 00 00 for  ∈ G and Ψ is a compact set.
Proof of Lemma C.11. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.10 in Hansen (2000). ¥
Lemma C.12. Let  () = √
£ (0 +  )−  (0)¤  Suppose that Assumptions
A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then on any compact set Ψ
 ()⇒ ()
where () is a vector Brownian motion with covariance matrix  [(1)(1)0] =  0 
Proof of Lemma C.12. First, we show the convergence of finite dimensional distribution:  () →
(0  0 ). Let () ≡ 1√
P
=1 √ [(0 +  ) − (0)] and F = ({()  ≤ }).
By Assumption A.1(ii) and Liapunov’s central limit theorem (e..g., Theorem 23.11 of Davidson (1994, pp.372-
373), it suﬃces to verify thatX
∈G0
()()0 → || 0 and
X
∈G0
k()k4 = (1)
Note that
X
∈G0
()()0 = 
X
∈G0
X
=1
02
¯¯(0 +  )− (0)¯¯
+


X
∈G0
X
1≤6=≤
0[(0 +  )− (0)][(0 +  )− (0)]
≡  + 
For   we can conduct similar calculations as used in the proof of Lemma C.3 to obtain
 £02 ¯¯(0 +  )− (0)¯¯¤
 → (
02| = 0)
Then we can readily show  → || 0 by using the Chebyshev inequality and the fact that {(  )}
is independent across  and strong mixing along the time dimension. Let  = [(0 +  ) −
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(0)] For   we have for any  × 1 nonrandom vector  with kk = 1 we have
| [0 ]| = 
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ X
∈G0
X
1≤6=≤
Cov(0 0)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ≤  X∈G0
−1X
=1
0X
=+1
|Cov(0 0)|
=


X
∈G0
X
0|−|≤0
|Cov(0 0)|+ 
X
∈G0
X
|−|0
|Cov(0 0)|
≤ 20 max max0|−|≤0 |Cov(
0
1 02)|+ 
X
∈G0
{ [0]}(3+0)(4+0)max kk
2
8+0
≤ 0(
¡ ¢−2) +  0(3+0)(4+0) =  (1)
provided 0 is chosen such that 0 = ( ) and 0(ln )0 → ∞ for some constant 0  1 This
implies that  [ ] = (1) In addition, it is easy to verify that Var[0 ] =  (1)  Then we have
 =  (1). Consequently, P∈G0 ()()0 → || 0 
Now, we verify that
P
∈G0 k()k4 = (1) Note that
X
∈G0
 [0()]4 =
2
( )2
X
∈G0

¯¯¯¯
¯0
X
=1

¯¯¯¯
¯
4
=
2
( )2
X
∈G0
X
=1
 (0)4 +  (1)
= ( ( )−1) +  (1) =  (1) 
where the second equality follows from the simple application of the Davydov inequality for strong mixing
processes and similar arguments as used in the analysis of   ThenP∈G0 k()k4 = (1) by Markov
inequality. Then the pointwise distributional result follows.
For the stochastic equicontinuity, the proof procedure is similar to that in Hansen (2000) and thus
omitted. ¥
Lemma C.13. Let ˜∗ () =  ˜ (0 +  ) and ˜∗ () =  ˜ (0 +  ).
Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)-(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then ˜∗ () → 0 and ˜∗ () →
0 uniformly in  ∈ Ψ, where Ψ is a compact set.
Proof of Lemma C.13. By the proof of Lemma C.9, we have
[˜∗ ()] = 
µ
1

¯¯ ¯¯+ ¯¯ ¯¯2¶ =  (1) 
Let () = −1P=1 (), where () = kk ¯¯(0 +  )− (0)¯¯  Let ˜() = () −
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[()] Then
Var(˜∗ ()) = 2
⎡
⎢⎣
¯¯¯¯
¯¯−1 X
∈0
{()2 −[()2]}
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
2
⎤
⎥⎦ =
2
2
X
∈0
{()2 −[()2]}2
≤ 
2
2
X
∈G0

"
−1
X
=1
()
#4
≤ 8
2
2
X
∈G0

"
−1
X
=1
˜()
#4
+
82
2
X
∈0

"
−1
X
=1
 [()]
#4
≤ 
2
2 4
X
∈G0
⎧
⎨
⎩
X
=1
 [˜()]4 +
Ã X
=1
 [˜()]2
!2⎫⎬
⎭+  (1) +(
−1 −2 )
=  ¡−1 −3 +−1 −2¢+  (1) =  (1) 
where the first equality follows from the Jensen inequality, the second inequality follows from the  in-
equality, the third one follows from the repeated application of Davydov inequality and the fact that
max [()] = (−1 ) and the next to last equality holds by the moment calculations. Then
˜∗ () =  (1) for each  ∈ Ψ This result, in conjunction with the monotonicity of ˜∗ () in ei-
ther the half line [0∞) or the half line (−∞ 0] implies that ˜∗ () → 0 uniformly in  ∈ Ψ. See Hansen
(2000, p. 598).
For ˜∗ () we can follow the above arguments and show that ˜∗ () =  (1) for each  ∈ Ψ
Following Lemma A.11 in Hansen (2000), we can readily show the tightness of the process {˜∗ ()} As a
result, we have ˜∗ () → 0 uniformly in  ∈ Ψ. ¥
Lemma C.14. Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)—(iv) and A.4—A.5 hold. Then on any compact set
Ψ,
∗ ()⇒ −2  ||+ 2
q
2 () = 
Ã
−
2 2
 ||+ 2(
2 2
 )
!
,
where  = 00  0 0 .
Proof of Lemma C.14. Let (0 +   0) = [1[1(0 +  ) − 1(0)]   [ (0 +
 )−  (0)]]0. We have
∗ () = ˇ(ˇ 0)− ˇ(ˇ 0 +  )
= − X
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0(0 +   0)0 + 2
X
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0
+ ()
where
 () = 2( )(ˇ − 0)0∗ ()− 2( )ˇ0∗ ()( )(ˇ − 0)
−( )(ˇ − 0)0∗ ()( )(ˇ + 0) + ( )ˇ0˜∗ ()( )ˇ
+2( )ˇ0˜∗ ()− 2ˇ0
X
∈0
(0 +   0)0M0(0)(ˇ − 0)
≡ 1 () + + 6 ()
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By Lemma C.10, we haveX
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0(0 +   0)0
= ( )−2 X
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0(0 +   0)0
= (

 )
2

X
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0(0 +   0)0
= (

 )
2∗ ()⇒ 2  || 
By Lemma C.11, we haveX
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0 = ( )−
X
∈G0
00 (0 +   0)0
= (

 )
( )12−00
£ (0 +  )−  (0)¤
= (

 )
 ()
⇒ 00 () = √()
By the fact that ( )(ˇ − 0) =  (1)  Assumption A.1(vi), and Lemma C.10, we have  () =(1) uniformly in  for  = 1 2 3 4. By Lemma C.12 we have that 5 () = (1) uniformly in . For6 (), we have
|6 ()| ≤ 2©( ) °°ˇ°°ª©( ) °°ˇ − 0°°ª 
°°°°°°
X
∈0
(0 +   0)0M0(0)
°°°°°°
=  (1)  (1) (1) =  (1) uniformly in  ∈ Ψ
as we can follow the proofs of Lemmas C.10 and C.12 and show that

 ||
P
∈0 (0+  0)0M0(0)||
=  (1) uniformly in  ∈ Ψ Consequently, we have ∗ ()⇒ −2  ||+ 2
q
2 () on any
compact set Ψ ¥
D Determination of the Number of Groups
Recall that ˆ2() ≡ 1Q(Θˆ() Dˆ() Gˆ()) Let ¯2 ≡ 1
P
=1
P
=1 2 In the estimation, we require
each group to contain at least bc individuals. We denote the index set of members in group  as G,
where G ∈ G = {G˜, |G˜|  bc} for all  ∈ G. Let ˆ = |G|  We can define five empirical processes
that depend on G:
(G ) = 1ˆ
X
∈G
()0M0 ∆(G  ∗) = 1ˆ
X
∈G
( ∗)0M0
Φ1(G ) = 1ˆ
X
∈G
()0M0(), Φ2(G  ∗) = 1ˆ
X
∈G
()0M0( ∗) and
Φ3(G  ∗) = 1ˆ
X
∈G
( ∗)0M0( ∗)
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LetG be any possible group structure when the number of groups in {1 2 } is given by We assume
the following conditions hold for the empirical processes.
Assumption D.1. (i) Pr
¡
inf(G)∈×Γ min [Φ1(G )] ≥ 
¢→ 1 as ( )→∞ for some   0;
(ii) Pr
¡
infG∈ inf |−∗|¯ min
£Φ3(G  ∗)−Φ2(G  ∗)0Φ1(G )−1Φ2(G  ∗)¤  | − ∗| ≥ ¢
→ 1 as ( )→∞ for some   0 and ¯  0;
(iii) Pr
³
supG∈ sup|−∗|¯ kΦ(G  ∗)k  | − ∗| ≤ 
´
→ 1 for  = 2 3 as ( )→∞ for some
  0;
(iv) Pr
³
sup(G)∈×Γ k(G )k ≤ −12
´
→ 1 for some   0;
(v) Pr
³
supG∈ sup|−∗|¯ k∆(G  ∗)k  | − ∗| ≤ −12
´
→ 1 for some   0 and ¯  0
Assumption D.2. (i) As ( )→∞,min1≤0 minG ˆ2G → ¯2  2 where 2 ≡ lim( )→∞( )−1P
=1
P
=1
¡2¢ 
(ii)  → 0 and  →∞ as ( )→∞.
Assumption D.1(i)-(iii) requires the sample covariance matrices are well behaved for any subset of in-
dividuals. Assumption D.1(iv) is the assumption that plays the most important role in our analysis. It
requires sup(G)∈×Γ k(G )k = (−12) for all (G ) ∈ G × Γ. For the true group members
G0, we can show that (G0 ) = (( )−12) under some regularity conditions. However when we are
estimating the model with   0 it is possible that
°°°(Gˆ )°°° = (−12). Similar remarks hold for
D.1(v). Assumption D.2 specifies the usual condition for the consistency of an information criterion. In
particular, Assumption D.2(i) in conjunction with the first part of D.2(ii) helps to eliminate all underfitted
models and the second part of D.2(ii) helps to eliminate the overfitted models.
Proposition D.1 Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 in the text and Assumption D.1 hold. The following state-
ment holds:
ˆ2()− ¯2 = (−1) for any 0 ≤  ≤ max
Remark. The probability order (−1) in the above proposition is not a conservative order. To illustrate
this point, we consider a simple regression where  = + so that there is only one group. If we estimate
the model with  = 2, we have
0 ≥  £ˆ2(2)− ¯2 ¤ = 1
2X
=1
X
∈Gˆ
X
=1
⎛
⎝ − 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
X
=1

⎞
⎠
2
− 1
X
=1
X
=1
2
=
1

2X
=1
X
∈Gˆ
X
=1
⎛
⎝ − 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
X
=1

⎞
⎠
2
− 1
X
=1
X
=1
2
= −
2X
=1
ˆ

⎛
⎝ 1
ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
¯·
⎞
⎠
2
≤ −
2X
=1
˜

⎛
⎝
√
˜
X
∈G˜
¯·
⎞
⎠
2

where ¯· = 1
P
=1  G˜1 = {|¯· ≤ 0} G˜2 = {|¯·  0} ˜ =
¯¯¯
G˜
¯¯¯
 and the last inequality holds by the
definitions of {Gˆ} and ˆ2(2) [Note that ˆ2(2) is minimized at (Gˆ1 Gˆ2).] Without loss of generality, we
suppose that  is i.i.d.  (0 1) over both  and . Then  ≡ √ ¯· v  (0 1) and by the strong law of
large numbers¯¯¯¯
¯¯√˜1
X
∈G˜1
¯·
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯
√
˜1
X
=1
¯·1 (¯· ≤ 0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ = ˜1
¯¯¯¯
¯ 1
X
=1
1 ( ≤ 0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ → 2 | [1 ( ≤ 0)]| 
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where  v  (0 1) and we use the fact that ˜1 = 1
P
=1 1 (¯· ≤ 0) →  ( ≤ 0) = 12  Similarly,¯¯¯¯
¯¯√˜2
X
∈G˜2
¯·
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯
√
˜2
X
=1
¯·1 (¯·  0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ = ˜2
¯¯¯¯
¯ 1
X
=1
1 (  0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ → 2 | [1 (  0)]| 
This calculation indicates that the negative value  £ˆ2(2)− ¯2 ¤ has the probability order  ¡−1¢ that
cannot be  ¡−1¢  In other words, the order (−1) is a tight probability order for ˆ2(2)− ¯2 
Proof of Proposition D.1. Following similar arguments as used in the proofs of Lemmas A.1-A.3, we can
show that individuals from the true group G0 would stay in the same estimated group w.p.a.1, i.e.,
Pr
∙
sup
1≤≤
1(ˆ = ˆ  0 6= 0 ) = 1
¸
→ 0 as ( )→∞
We only consider the case where some true groups are further divided into several groups. For notational
simplicity, we only consider the case 0 = 1 where our true parameters can be rewritten as (00 0)0 =
(00 00 0)0 without the group-specific subscript. Since we still estimate a PSTR model with  ≥ 1 groups,
the estimators, e.g., (ˆ()  ˆ() ) still have the group-specific subscript. But for notational brevity, we will
denote (ˆ()  ˆ() ) as (ˆ ˆ) Then we can write Q(Θˆ() Dˆ() Gˆ()) =P=1 Q¯(ˆ ˆ) where Q¯(· ·) is
defined in Section 4.1. Following the analysis for (C.2) in the proof of Lemma C.2, we have
ˆ − 0 = Φ¯1(ˆ)−1 1ˆ
X
∈Gˆ
(ˆ)0M0 − Φ¯1(ˆ)−1Φ¯2(ˆ)0 (D.1)
where Φ¯1() ≡ 1ˆ
P
∈Gˆ ()0M0() = Φ1(Gˆ ) and Φ¯2() ≡ 1ˆ
P
∈Gˆ ()0M0( 0) =
Φ2(Gˆ  0). Following the similar analysis for (C.3) of Lemma C.2, we have
1
ˆ
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
= 00Φ¯3(ˆ)0 + (ˆ − 0)0Φ¯1(ˆ)(ˆ − 0) + 2(ˆ − 0)0Φ¯2(ˆ)0
−(ˆ − 0)0 2
X
∈Gˆ
(ˇ)0M0 − ˆ0 2
X
∈Gˆ
(ˆ 0)0M0
where Φ¯3() ≡ 1ˆ
P
∈Gˆ ( 0)0M0( 0) = Φ3(Gˆ  0). Plugging (D.1) into the above equation,
we have
1
ˆ
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
= 00 £Φ¯3(ˆ)− Φ¯2(ˆ)0Φ¯1(ˆ)−1Φ¯2(ˆ)¤ 0
−(Gˆ ˆ)0Φ¯1(ˆ)−1(Gˆ ˆ) + 200Φ¯2(ˆ)0Φ¯1(ˆ)−1(Gˆ ˆ)
−2
³
ˆ − 0
´0∆(Gˆ ˆ 0)− 200∆(Gˆ ˆ 0)
≡ ∆Q¯1 + +∆Q¯5
We discuss two cases: (1) ( )− 12 = (1) and (2) ( )− 12 →∞ as ( )→∞
In Case (1), we have 0 = (−12) By Assumption D.1(iii) and equation (D.1), we can readily show
that ˆ − 0 = (−12). With this result, then we can show that ∆Q¯ = (−1) for  = 1  5 by
using Assumption D.1.
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In Case (2), we have ˆ − 0 = (−12 + ( )− ¯¯ˆ − 0 ¯¯) by (D.1) and Assumption D.1(iii). Then
we can apply Assumption D.1 to show that
∆Q¯1 = (( )−2 ¯¯ˆ − 0 ¯¯) ∆Q¯2 = (−1)
∆Q¯3 = (−12( )− ¯¯ˆ − 0¯¯)
∆Q¯4 = (−12( )− ¯¯ˆ − 0¯¯2 + −1 ¯¯ˆ − 0¯¯) and
∆Q¯5 = (−12( )− ¯¯ˆ − 0¯¯ 
Because ∆Q¯1  0 by Assumption D.1(ii) and 1ˆ
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
 0 by the definition of
least squares estimation, we can conclude ∆Q¯1 should have at most the same order as P5=2∆Q¯. By
comparison between these orders, we can show that
¯¯ˆ − 0 ¯¯ = (−1( )2) andP5=1∆Q¯ = (−1)
follows. Consequently,
0 ≥ ˆ2()− ¯2 = 1
X
=1
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
=
X
=1
ˆ

1
ˆ
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
≥
X
=1
1
ˆ
h
Q¯(ˆ ˆ)− Q¯(0 0)
i
= (−1)
This implies that ˆ2()− ¯2 = (−1) for any 0 ≤  ≤ max ¥
E Consistency of groupmembership estimators in the fixed-threshold-
eﬀect framework
In this section, we discuss the asymptotic property of our least squares estimator under the constant threshold
eﬀect framework (i.e.,  = 0). Suppose Assumptions A.1-A.5 hold except that we now let  = 0. Then one
can follow the arguments as used in the proofs of Lemmas C.2-C.10 to show that
¯¯ˇ − 0 ¯¯ = (( )−1)
and ˇ = ˇ(0) + (( )−12), where (ˇ ˇ) is infeasible estimator for  ∈ G.
In the PSTR model, the major diﬃculty is to show the consistency of the estimator of the latent group
structure as in Theorem 3.1. Once we establish a similar result as that of Lemma A.3, we can prove
Theorem 3.1. In addition, we can prove Lemmas A.4-A.6 which confirms
¯¯ˆ − 0 ¯¯ = (( )−1) and
ˆ = ˇ + (( )−12). In the following analysis, we give a sketch of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in the
fixed-threshold-eﬀect framework.
To proceed, we add some notations. Define
˜ ( ˜G) ≡ 1
X
=1
X
=1
1(0 = )1( = ˜)
£
(00)2|0
¤ 
where (·|) ≡ (·| = ). We impose an additional identification condition:
Assumption E.1. As ( )→∞, the following statements hold: (i) For some constants   0 and ¯  0
we have
sup
1≤≤
sup
(0∗‘)‘∈B2
sup
|−∗|¯
(
Pr
" X
=1
[˜()0 − ˜(∗)0∗]2 ≤

X
=1
[( − ∗)0˜(∗)]2 + | − ∗| £(0)2|¤
#)
= (−4);
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(ii) There exists a constant   0 such that for all  ∈ G,
Pr
µ
inf
(GD)∈G×Γ
max˜∈G {min[ ( ˜DG)] ∧ ˜ ( ˜G)}  
¶
→ 1;
(iii) For all  ˜ ∈ G, where  6= ˜, we have °°(00  0)0 − (00˜  0˜)0°°   for some constant   0;
(iv) For any  6= ˜ and 1 ≤  ≤  , we have
max
¡[˜(0)0(0˜ − 0)]2 ¯¯0˜ − 0 ¯¯ £(00˜)2|0˜¤¢ ≡ ˜˜ ≥ ˜˜
for some constant ˜˜  0
Assumption E.1 (i) is a non-colinearity condition similar to Assumption A.4(ii) in the main text. How-
ever, it requires that the non-colinearity property should hold for each individual. Assumption E.1(ii) is
modified from Assumption A.2. Assumption E.1(iii)-(iv) is modified from Assumption A.3(i)-(ii). As re-
marked in Section 3.1, E.1(iv) is redundant if we assume that min([˜(0)˜(0)0]) and 00 (0|0)0
are bounded below from zero by a constant  say.
Below we prove Theorem 3.1 under Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)-(iv) and E.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Lemma A.1 still holds under the stated conditions. Lemmas A.2-A.3 are replaced
by Lemmas E.1 and E.2 below. Combining Lemmas E.1-E.2 we have the desired claim. ¥
Lemma E.1. Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)-(iv) and E.1 hold. Then we have ((Θˆ Dˆ) (Θ0D0)) →
0, where
((Θˆ Dˆ) (Θ0D0)) = max
½
max∈G
µ
min˜∈G
°°°ˆ − 0˜°°°2 + ¯¯ˆ − 0˜ ¯¯¶  max˜∈G
µ
min∈G
°°°ˆ − 0˜°°°2 + ¯¯ˆ − 0˜ ¯¯¶¾ 
Proof of Lemma E.1. It suﬃces to show (i) max∈G
³
min˜∈G
°°°ˆ − 0˜°°°+ ¯¯ˆ − 0˜ ¯¯´ = (1) and (ii)
max˜∈G
³
min∈G
°°°ˆ − 0˜°°°+ ¯¯ˆ − 0˜ ¯¯´ = (1)
We first show (i). By Lemma A.1, we have
1
 Q˜(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) =
1
 Q(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) + (1) ≤
1
 Q(Θ
0D0G0) + (1)
=
1
 Q˜(Θ
0D0G0) + (1)
where the inequality holds by the definition of least squares estimator. On the other hand, noting that
Q˜(ΘDG) is minimized at (Θ0D0G0), we have 1 [Q˜(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ) − Q˜(Θ0D0G0)] ≥ 0 It follows that
1
 [Q˜(Θˆ Dˆ Gˆ)− Q˜(Θ0D0G0)] = (1) By direct calculation, we have uniformly in (ΘDG)
1

h
Q˜(ΘDG)− Q˜(Θ0D0G0)
i
=
1

X
=1
X
=1
n
000 ˜(00 )− 0 ˜()
o2
≥ 
X
=1
X
=1
h
( − 00 )0˜()
i2
+


X
=1
X
=1
¯¯¯
 − 00
¯¯¯

h
(000 )2|00
i
+ (1)
=
X
=1
X
˜=1


X
=1
X
=1
1(0 = )1( = ˜)
n£
(0 − ˜)0˜(˜)
¤2
+
¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯ £(00)2|0¤o+ (1)
= 
X
=1
X
˜=1
h
(0 − ˜)0 ( ˜DG)(0 − ˜) +
¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯ ˜ ( ˜G)i+ (1)
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where the inequality holds by Assumption E.1(i) and the last equation is by the definitions of ( ˜DG)
and ˜ ( ˜G). It follows that
(1) = 
X
=1
X
˜=1
h
(0 − ˜)0 ( ˜DG)(0 − ˜) +
¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯ ˜ ( ˜G)i+ (1)
≥ 
X
=1
X
˜=1
n
min[ ( ˜DG)] ∧ ˜ ( ˜G)
o³°°0 − ˜°°2 + ¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯´+ (1)
≥ max∈G
X
˜=1
n
min[ ( ˜DG)] ∧ ˜ ( ˜G)
o³°°0 − ˜°°2 + ¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯´+ (1)
≥ max∈G
µ
min˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°2 + ¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯¶ X
˜=1
n
min[ ( ˜DG)] ∧ ˜ ( ˜G)
o
+ (1)
≥ max∈G
µ
min˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°2 + ¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯¶+ (1)
where the last inequality is by Assumption E.1(ii) which says that there exists a group ˜∗ ∈ G such thatn
min[ ( ˜DG)] ∧ ˜ ( ˜G)
o
   0 w.p.a.1. Consequently, we have
max∈G
µ
min˜∈G
°°°0 − ˆ˜°°°2 + ¯¯˜ − 0 ¯¯¶ =  (1) 
To show (ii), we can follow a similar analysis given in the proof of Lemma A.2. The details are omitted here.
¥
Remark. The proof of Lemma E.1 shows that there exists a permutation Θˆ such that
°°°ˆ − 0Θˆ()°°°2 +¯¯¯
ˆ − 0Θˆ()
¯¯¯
= (1) We can take Θˆ() =  by relabeling. In the following analysis, we shall write°°°ˆ − 0Θˆ()°°°2 + ¯¯¯ˆ − 0Θˆ() ¯¯¯ = (1) without referring to the relabeling any more.
Lemma E.2. Let ˆ(ΘD) = argmin∈GP=1 £˜ − ˜()0¤2  Suppose that Assumptions A.1, A.3(iii)-
(iv) and E.1 hold. Then we have that for some   0,
Pr
Ã
sup
(ΘD)∈N˜
"
1

X
=1
1(ˆ(ΘD) 6= 0 )
#!
= (−4)
where N˜ =
n
(ΘD) ∈ B × Γ : °° − 0°°2 + ¯¯ − 0 ¯¯    ∈ Go
Proof of Lemma E.2. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.3 except the details of bounding Z(ΘD)
where
Z(ΘD) ≡ 1(0 6= )1
Ã X
=1
[˜ − ˜()0)]2 ≤
X
=1
[˜ − ˜(0 )00 ]2
!

For Z(ΘD), we have
Z(ΘD) ≤ max˜∈G\{}1 (( ˜) ≤ 0) 
where
( ˜) =
X
=1
[˜(˜)0˜ − ˜()0]
½
1
2
[˜(˜)0˜ − ˜()0] + ˜ + ˜(0˜)00˜ − ˜(˜)0˜
¾

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Then we can follow the analysis of Lemma A.3 to show that
Z(ΘD) ≤ max˜∈\{}1
( X
=1
[˜(0˜)00˜ − ˜0(0)00]
½
1
2
[˜(0˜)00˜ − ˜0(0)00] + ˜
¾
≤ 
)
≡ Z˜
where  = √P=1(kk2 + 2) for some constant   0. Next, we can use the Assumption E.1(i) to
show that
Pr(Z˜ = 1) ≤
X
˜∈G\{}
Pr
(

2
X
=1
£
(0˜ − 0)0˜(0)
¤2
+
¯¯0˜ − 0 ¯¯ £(00˜)2|0˜¤
+
X
=1
[˜(0˜)00˜ − ˜0(0)00]˜ ≤ 
)
+ (−4)
Then one can use Assumption E.1(iv) and similar arguments as used in the proof of Lemma A.3 to show
that the leading term on the right hand side of the last inequality is (−4) The result then follows from
the Markov inequality as used in the proof of Lemma A.3. ¥
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